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INTERVENTIONS THAT BENEFIT SPECIAL INTERESTS
D. Daniel Sokol*
INTRODUCTION
In his bestseller, The Andromeda Strain, Michael Crichton tells the
story of a virus that the government tries to use as an ultimate weapon. The
virus gets out of control and needs to be restrained. In antitrust, there is a
similar government-created problem-that of antitrust immunities-where
government immunizes a monopolist from antitrust regulation. The action
that government immunizes spreads its bad effects both domestically and
globally. Paradoxically, the cure (antitrust) is not allowed to treat the virus
(monopoly power), because the government has already rendered the virus
immune from this sort of treatment.
When government regulates, it may either intentionally or unintention-
ally generate restraints that reduce competition ("public restraints"). Public
restraints allow a business to cloak its action in government authority and to
immunize it from antitrust regulation.' Private businesses may misuse the
government's grant of antitrust immunity to facilitate behavior that benefits
businesses at consumers' expense. One way is by obtaining government
grants of immunity from antitrust scrutiny. A recent series of Supreme
Court decisions has made this situation worse by limiting the reach of anti-
trust law in favor of sector regulation.2 This is true even though the Su-
* Assistant Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I wish to thank Peter Car-
stensen, Dan Crane, Mark Fenster, Susan Franck, David Gerber, Tom Ginsburg, Jeff Harrison, Christine
Klein, Phil Marsden, Bill Page, Juan Perea, Barak Richman, Ilya Somin, Maurice Stucke, Ed Swaine,
Phil Weiser, and Todd Zywicki for their comments. I also would like to thank the staff and editors of the
George Mason Law Review for their excellent work. All errors remain mine.
1 Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. Cll. L. REV. 165, 170
(2005) ("Protecting competition by focusing solely on private restraints is like trying to stop the water
flow at a fork in a stream by blocking only one channel. A system that sends private price fixers to jail,
but makes government regulation to fix prices legal, has not completely addressed the competitive
problem. It has simply dictated the form that the problem will take.").
2 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 279-84 (2007) (noting antitrust must
defer to a sector regulator enforcing a broad regulatory scheme in the SEC context); Verizon Commc'ns
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004) ("One factor of particular im-
portance is the existence of a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm.
Where such a structure exists, the additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement
will tend to be small .... "); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus., 540 U.S. 736, 748 (2004) (holding
antitrust liability does not apply to the U.S. Postal Service); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc'ns,
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preme Court refers to antitrust law as the "Magna Carta of free enterprise." 3
Yet the choice of sector regulation over antitrust regulation may have dele-
terious effects on consumers. For example, a country's banking or tele-
communications incumbent may be able to influence the legislature to cre-
ate a statutory monopoly. This government-created monopoly immunizes
the company from antitrust law even though it can abuse its monopoly posi-
tion in the market to hurt consumers. This behavior, in turn, produces sig-
nificant negative externalities that may worsen the very problems that anti-
trust law, now forced to take a backseat to other government regulatory
schemes, was intended to address. Worse, because the relationship between
anticompetitive regulation and antitrust law pervades the regulatory
schemes of numerous countries, the international externalities generated by
public restraints and barriers to entry for foreign firms that such restraints
create make this a problem with global implications.4
This Article offers a new contribution to the extensive literature on the
globalization of antitrust law. The present Article focuses both on the proc-
esses of creating public restraints, as well as upon the negative impacts of
these restraints. Government can exempt a company from antitrust regula-
tion, which allows the firm unbridled discretion to monopolize and harm
consumers. Much of the literature focuses on the globalization of private
anticompetitive conduct by businesses across jurisdictions.5 The focus of
this Article, the issue of government intervention in the economy and its
competitive impacts, has taken on renewed importance as the global finan-
cial crisis has led countries to provide various benefits to favored compa-
nies, which may distort competition. Distorting competition may keep the
world in recession longer, as countries may retaliate with new distortions of
their own, creating a downward spiral for the global economy. Thus, local
"solutions" may cause international problems, and require international
resolutions.
This Article does not suggest that all public restraints are inherently
bad. There are some cases in which public restraints' positive effects may
outweigh their costs. Some limited immunities help markets to function or
have a social purpose that has a minimal effect on competition. Where the
societal benefit of reduced information costs may not be reached without
government intervention, restraints that create incentives for private in-
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1123 (2009) (affirming lack of duty to deal when there is a regulatory scheme in
place).
3 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
4 Matthias Busse & Jose Luis Groizard, Foreign Direct Investment, Regulations, and Growth 21
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3882, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
so13/papers.cfmabstractid--923229 (concluding that excessive government regulation may restrict
foreign direct investment).
5 D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International
Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 37, 41 n.l (2007) (offering a general literature
review on international antitrust).
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vestment to reduce information costs may be necessary. Public restraints
may allow for these businesses to be compensated at a level at which the
private return matches the societal return. For example, public restraints
may create mechanisms for the exchange of information such as standard
setting.6
On the other hand, current public restraints which are overly broad and
force economies to become less competitive hurt consumers. Therefore, this
Article addresses only those public restraints that are anticompetitive. Some
public restraints appeal to a distributive agenda to reduce the societal strains
that increased efficiency and globalization may cause. While globalization
and increased trade are globally welfare-enhancing, 7 there are winners and
losers in globalization.8 Public restraints that respond to globalization, but
that protect only special interests at the expense of society, are targets of the
current Article.
This Article also includes a novel analysis of immunities to antitrust
law as a critical subset of anticompetitive public restraints. It addresses the
important domestic and international institutional dynamics of how to re-
duce such anticompetitive immunities. It then provides a theoretical frame-
work to identify potential domestic and international institutional responses
to public restraints and the costs and benefits of these responses. The insti-
tutional framework developed in this Article proposes both substantive
policies and institutional structures that can undertake these policies. The
framework builds on both new institutional economics and international
organization literatures, while recognizing the difficult limitations in design
and capacity that existing institutions face. No existing institution effec-
tively addresses public restraints. Therefore, the Article concludes with
recommended modifications to the World Trade Organization ("WTO")-
specifically, the creation of a specialized antitrust panel that would bring
6 Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1889, 1937 (2002) (stating that standard-setting may promote interoperability across products and
platforms of different firms). However, firms can abuse the standard-setting process when they exclude
competitors or block innovations of rivals. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A.
LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW §§ 35.4-35.8 (2003). It may be that some public restraints are neutral when it comes to
competitive effects. This Article addresses only those restraints that have anticompetitive effects.
7 Sebastian Edwards, Openness, Productivity and Growth: What Do We Really Know?, 108
ECON. J. 383, 396 (1998); Jeffrey A. Frankel & David Romer, Does Trade Cause Growth?, 89 AM.
ECON. REV. 379, 380-81 (1999); Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew Warner, Economic Reform and the Proc-
ess of Global Integration (Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 1, 2-3, 1995) available at
http://www.brookings.edu/press/Joumals/1995/bpeamacro951.aspx; Romain Wacziarg & Karen Horn
Welch, Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence, 22 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 187, 187-90
(2008).
8 See, e.g., Francisco Rodriguez & Dani Rodrik, Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's
Guide to the Cross-National Evidence, 15 MACROECONOMICS ANN. 261, 317-18 (2000).
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together antitrust and trade analyses-as the best solution in an imperfect
world to address anticompetitive public restraints.
Part I of this Article explores the causes and effects of public re-
straints. Part II analyzes the potential institutional choices to address public
restraints. In Part III, this Article undertakes a case study of the current in-
adequacies of existing institutional solutions to the problem of government
restraints. Part III then suggests a set of reforms to correct for the existing
institutional shortcomings. The Conclusion suggests that a modified WTO
is the least bad alternative to address international antitrust public restraints.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC RESTRAINTS
A. Types of Public Restraints
Public restraints can be distinguished from situations in which a busi-
ness may have achieved a monopoly position through, as the Supreme
Court states, "'growth or development as a consequence of a superior prod-
uct, business acumen, or historic accident." 9 What distinguishes a monop-
oly position via anticompetitive public restraints from one that emerges
from "business acumen" is the use of government power to monopolize
through the creation of barriers to reduce competition. Public restraints may
have important ramifications on economic growth and development by rais-
ing the cost of capital and placing barriers to business entry and exit. " Such
anticompetitive public restraints may impact international entry into a do-
mestic market." Public restraints harm consumers because they ultimately
pay for the cost of protection through higher taxes and/or prices to subsidize
the public restraints.
Public restraints may have a more significant impact in situations in
which the business aided by such restraints has substantial market power
independent of the restraint. 12 Market power in conjunction with public
restraints allows for far-reaching negative effects on consumers in two
ways. First, an industry immunized from antitrust law coverage may act
anticompetitively in its own sector, where it can restrict output, refuse to
9 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)
(quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
10 The more severe the public restraint, the greater the potential benefit of a particular interest
group to use government to create such a restraint. Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Mo-
nopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).
11 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Devel-
opment in the 20th Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 20 (2003); Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of
Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1, 35 (2002).
12 Pietro Crocioni, Can State Aid Policy Become more Economic Friendly?, 29 WORLD
COMPETITION 89, 92 (2006).
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deal with competitors, and raise prices without any concern for antitrust law
ramifications. Such support allows businesses with a monopoly to exercise
their monopoly power to pursue aggressive predation strategies. 3 Second, a
public restraint that allows for a sector to be immunized from antitrust scru-
tiny can create distortions in other sectors of the economy.'4 An immunity
creates the possibility of cross-subsidization from the immunized product or
service to one in which there is competition. For example, if a postal serv-
ice provider has a monopoly because of legislation (such as the U.S. Postal
Service), there is the potential for the provider to anticompetitively cross-
subsidize into next day delivery services, where there is competition from
other firms. 5
Government distorts the competitive process through public restraints,
which create de facto subsidies to firms. Subsidies reduce budgetary con-
straints on firms. And this reduces the incentive for firms to maximize their
efficiency, since government serves to protect them from competition. 6
Antitrust enforcers or private litigants may have difficulty in imputing these
subsidies into cost tests that would determine the true cost associated with
exclusionary conduct such as predation."
Immunities from antitrust law privilege other forms of regulation over
antitrust regulation and cause competitive distortions, which may have in-
ternational effects. Anticompetitive public restraints can have international
effects in one of two ways. First, anticompetitive practices may be exported
to other countries through spillover effects from inadequate domestic reme-
dies.'8 In these situations, the full cost of anticompetitive behavior by com-
13 Id.
14 R. Shyam Khemani, U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. ("UNCTAD"), Application of Competition
Law: Exemption and Exclusions 5, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/Misc.25 (2002), available at
http://www.unctad.org/EN/docs/ditcclpmisc25 en.pdf.
15 R. Richard Geddes, Pricing by State-Owned Enterprises: The Case of Postal Services, 29
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 575, 579-86 (2008) (providing empirical evidence of anticompetitive
cross-subsidization by the U.S. Postal Service); D. Daniel Sokol, Express Delivery and the Postal Sector
in the Context of Public Sector Anti-Competitive Practices, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 353, 356-66
(2003) (offering cross country case studies of potential anticompetitive cross-subsidization).
16 Explicit aid may include direct financial injections through loans or subsidies to firms. Indirect
support may include preferential tax treatment or other forms of compensation. Marc Hansen, Anne van
Ysendyck & Susanne Zuhlke, The Coming of Age of EC State Aid Law: A Review of the Principal
Developments in 2002 and 2003, 4 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 202, 202 (2004).
17 D. Daniel Sokol, Comparative Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 2009 BYU L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Sokol, Comparative Corporate Governance].
18 The international market access dynamic is similar to the basic problem of federalism and
restraints of trade across states. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 281 (2d ed. 2001) ("A situation
in which the benefits of government action are concentrated in one state and the costs in other states is a
recipe for irresponsible state action. This is a genuine downside of federalism. The federal government
... is ... less subject to take-over by a faction."); Maxwell L. Steams, A Beautiful Mind A Game Theo-
retical Analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2003)
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panies is not felt in their home jurisdictions. For example, a government
may immunize an export cartel that fixes prices abroad, but not at home,
from antitrust scrutiny. 9 Such practices only negatively affect non-domestic
consumers. The lack of sufficient international coordination on public re-
straints that create spillover effects in other jurisdictions limits what any
one country can do to counteract such effects. Indeed, this is analogous to
the creation of a national antitrust law under the Sherman Act because of
the inability of state antitrust statutes to reach anticompetitive conduct that
spilled over across states.
Second, public restraints limit opportunities for foreign businesses to
compete because public restraints create barriers to entry. These govern-
ment-created entry barriers limit the market's effectiveness in reducing
inefficient businesses' market power. Competition stimulates increased
efficiency and productivity. ° By limiting the threat of entry, public re-
straints reduce market dynamism.2 As most markets around the world are
highly concentrated, foreign entry is often the primary source of potential
competition.22 As a result of such entry barriers, incumbent firms have
fewer incentives to undertake risks that may produce innovation and eco-
nomic growth.
One example of the importance of lower entry barriers can be found in
the U.S. Department of Justice's ("DOJ") analysis on the competitive ef-
fects of the Whirlpool/Maytag merger. I do not address the merits of the
DOJ approach, which has come under criticism.23 Rather, I use this merger
to illustrate that the DOJ premised its 2006 unconditional approval of the
Whirlpool acquisition of Maytag in part on the ability of foreign brands to
(arguing that the role of the dormant Commerce Clause within U.S. jurisprudence has been to limit the
power of individual states in the absence of direct federal legislation).
19 D. Daniel Sokol, What Do We Really Know About Export Cartels and What is the Appropriate
Solution?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 967, 967-68, 974 (2008) (providing a review of the empirical
literature on export cartels).
20 Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 577, 587 (2007); P.J.G. Van Cayseele, Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey
of the Last Twenty Years, 146 DE ECONOMIST 391, 393 (1998); Stephen J. Nickell, Competition and
Corporate Performance, 104 J. POL. ECON. 724, 741 (1996); John Vickers, Concepts of Competition, 47
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 1-4 (1995).
21 This situation may impact both static and dynamic efficiencies. Org. for Econ. Cooperation &
Dev. [OECD], Regulating Market Activities in Public Sector, 7 OECD J. COMPETITION L. & POL'Y 21,
33 (2005).
22 MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES 8-9 (2003) (analyzing
the unique problems of highly concentrated markets in small economies); Todd Mitton, Institutions and
Concentration, 86 J. DEV. ECON. 367, 368 (2008) (finding higher firm level concentration in countries
with higher entry costs for new entrants and in countries with weaker antitrust policy).
23 Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Detecting and Reversing the Decline in Horizontal Merger
Enforcement, 22 ANTITRUST 29, 30 (2008).
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enter the U.S. market should the merged entity attempt to raise prices.24
DOJ's belief was that foreign competition could discipline any price in-
creases even though the combined company would control two-thirds of all
washers and dryers produced for sale in the United States.2 ' Had there been
high barriers to foreign entry, international competition would not have
been a factor in the market, and the proposed merger may have reduced
competition.
Because of the cost of information, different jurisdictions may not be
aware of the global nature of an anticompetitive harm caused by public
restraints. Each jurisdiction will not feel the entire effect of the world-wide
harm, only the harm that occurs in its own country. There may not be
enough of a basis to bring a successful antitrust claim based on anticompeti-
tive conduct because, in a limited sense, domestic antitrust law (as opposed
to a broader competition policy) lacks the appropriate tools. An antitrust
agency's enforcement authority stops at its nation's border, but the prob-
lems are transnational. The lack of effective domestic antitrust tools to rem-
edy such conduct may lead to a gap in enforcement. When spillover effects
or entry barriers affect international antitrust law, it may be difficult for
domestic institutions to provide an adequate remedy. Moreover, it is not
just an information problem that leads to under-enforcement. The jurisdic-
tion does not capture the full benefits of enforcement-this is why there is
an externality in the first place. Countries may have no incentive, either
because of political capture by local monopolists or because of a country's
industrial policy.
B. The Difficulty of Quantifying the Impact of Public Restraints
Most of international trade liberalization involves dismantling interna-
tional public restraints. Much of this total trade gain, which is specific to
the reduction of antitrust-related public restraints, is not easily quantified.
Generally, regulatory barriers are more costly than tariff and other "at-the-
border" barriers.26 Unlike tariffs, "behind-the-border" regulatory barriers
raise the cost to foreign suppliers through expenditures that cannot be trans-
ferred to another party. Moreover, as noted above, the costs of regulatory
barriers are difficult to quantify. 27 However, empirical work positively as-
24 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Statement on the Closing of Its Investiga-
tion of Whirlpool's Acquisition of Maytag (Mar. 29, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/press releases/2006/215326.htm.
25 Elizabeth Armington, Eric Emch & Ken Heyer, The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust
Division, 2005-2006, 29 REV. INDUST. ORG. 305, 312 (2006).
26 Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1, 7-11 (1999).
27 A country can use a tariff to raise the entry cost for foreign goods. The information needed to
measure the effect of this tariff for a given country is relatively easy to obtain. To do so, one collects
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sociates robust competition at the country level with growth. Antitrust regu-
lation seems to have a statistically significant relationship to such growth.28
Given that the removal of government restraints generally has improved
aggregate global welfare, it stands to reason that the removal of antitrust-
related restraints may yield significant economic benefits to consumers
around the world.
Some empirical studies provide a glimpse of the extent of the antitrust-
related public restraints problem through specific sector studies.29 In one
such study, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") measured the prevalence of its member countries' public re-
straints. These restraints included: state control (scope of public enterprise
sector, size of public enterprise sector, direct control over business enter-
prise, use of command and control regulation, price controls); barriers to
competition (legal barriers, antitrust exemptions); and barriers to trade and
investment (ownership barriers, discriminatory procedures, regulatory bar-
riers, tariffs).3" Overall, the study found that there is less of an impact of
such public restraints in OECD countries currently than in previous years.
However, significant regulations that restrict competition remain in effect in
nearly all OECD countries.3" Another study found that discriminatory gov-
ernment treatment reduced growth rates by as much as 10 percent over a
three-year period.32 And a study by Simeon Djankov et al. found that gov-
ernment barriers make entry more difficult.33 Building upon this work,
Raymond Fisman and Virginia Sarria-Allende found that countries that
information on the amount of a product that enters the market and the tariff rate placed on such prod-
ucts. Regulatory barriers work differently. The difficulty in estimating the cost of antitrust public re-
straints makes it more difficult for consumers and politicians to grasp the costs of government-created
economic distortions.
28 Mark A. Dutz & Aydin Hayri, Does More Intense Competition Lead to Higher Growth? 1
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2320, 1999), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cffm?abstract id=630693.
29 See, e.g., DAVID M. NEWBERY, PRIVATIZATION, RESTRUCTURING, AND REGULATION OF
NETWORK UTILITIES (1999); ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION:
THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE (1999); Arturo Galindo & Alejandro Micco, Do State Owned
Banks Promote Growth? Cross-Country Evidence for Manufacturing Industries, 84 ECON. LETTERS 371
(2004); Paola Sapienza, The Effects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 357
(2004).
30 Paul Conway, Veronique Janod & Guiseppe Nicoletti, Product Market Regulation in OECD
Countries: 1998 to 2003 8 (OECD, Working Paper No. 419, 2005), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/
oec/ecoaaa/419-en.html.
31 Id. at 32. There is a lack of similar empirical measures on public restraints in a developing-
world context.
32 Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones & Daniel Kaufmann, Far From Home: Do Foreign Investors
Import Higher Standards of Governance in Transition Economies? 14 (World Bank Institute Policy
Research, Working Paper No. 2444, 2000) available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=386900.
33 Djankov et al., supra note 11, at 3-4.
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heavily regulate entry through public restraints in sectors with low natural
barriers to entry experience a high concentration of large firms.34 Higher
concentration increases the possibility of monopolization.
C. Causes of Public Restraints
Regulations themselves cause public restraints by allowing, or even
requiring, anticompetitive behavior. As other forms of regulation may pre-
empt antitrust law implicitly or explicitly, this anticompetitive behavior is
immune from prosecution under antitrust laws. Moreover, overly broad (or
just badly decided) judicial decisions may increase the scope of public re-
straints. Thus, the sector regulator, the legislature, and the judiciary can
each cause and perpetuate public restraints.35
Public choice theory, and its application of economic rational choice
theory to politics, clarifies how anticompetitive public restraints come into
being.36 Public choice explains that regulation is often a product of rent-
seeking (manipulating the regulatory environment for personal gain) by
interest groups.37 Consequently, laws and regulations will tend to benefit
small, well-organized interest groups rather than society overall. Interest
groups (mis)use government to create immunities from antitrust law. This
rent-seeking behavior by interest groups redistributes resources away from
their efficient use to use by other actors.38 Rent-seeking thus limits the op-
portunities for growth by a country.39
34 Raymond Fisman & Virginia Sarria-Allende, Regulation of Entry and the Distortion of Indus-
trial Organization 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10929, 2004), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 0929.
35 Deborah Platt Majoras, State Intervention: A State of Displaced Competition, 13 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 1175, 1179-82 (2007) (providing examples of such restraints).
36 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the
Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 703 (1987) ("The legislature is a political battlefield;
most of its activity is no more purposive than the expedient accommodation of special interest pres-
sures."). See also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 873, 874-75 (1987); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (3d ed. 2003) (reviewing recent
literature in public choice theory). Public restraints are not caused merely by public choice problems.
There are also situations where a majority of the electorate may choose bad economic policies, such as
with price controls. However, as an empirically untested observation, it seems that public choice expla-
nations account for more of antitrust public restraints, especially regarding immunities, and so this
Article focuses on political malfunctions due to public choice concerns in antitrust law and policy.
37 See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 9 (1962); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971).
38 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 141-48 (1965).
39 Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shlcifer & Robert W. Vishny, Why is Rent-Seeking so Costly to
Growth?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 409,409 (1993).
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1. Legislative Immunities
The legislative failure that strengthens the position of interest groups
over that of the general population explains why many antitrust immunities
come into being.a In a world of interest groups, antitrust agencies may be
less politically powerful than other interest groups that shape regulation.
Antitrust law does not have a well organized and powerful constituency
with which to push for procompetitive change.41 Unlike specific policies
that benefit a particular industry or other interests (e.g., labor), the benefits
of antitrust law are diffuse. Increased welfare affects each consumer,
whether a business or individual, only marginally, though the aggregate
societal consequences may be significant.
There are many examples of how the public choice dynamic works in
legislation that negatively impacts or limits antitrust regulation. The pas-
sage of the Robinson-Patman Act,42 for example, can be explained in large
part as a public choice story.43 The Act's purpose was to protect competi-
tors." The Act had its origins in the work of the United States Wholesale
Grocers Association, which proposed the precursor to the Act at its 1935
annual meeting.45 The initial title of the Act reflected the particular interest
group that sought protection-"Wholesale Grocer's Protection Act."46 In
particular, the Act was an attempt by politically well-organized smaller
retailers to reduce the ability of the A&P grocery chain to use its scale ad-
40 Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 212
(1976) ("A common, though not universal, conclusion has become that, as between the two main con-
tending interests in regulatory processes, the producer interest tends to prevail over the consumer inter-
est." (footnote omitted)).
41 This of course assumes that antitrust's purpose is procompetitive in nature and that competition
means efficiency enhancing. The current state of antitrust law in the U.S., for example, is based on a
Chicago School approach. William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution ofAntitrust: Char-
acterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1228-43 (1989) (ex-
plaining the emergence of the Chicago School). However, U.S. antitrust law went through periods of
populist driven enforcement. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?,
in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS, AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 195-96 (1967).
42 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936) (limiting price discrimination).
43 But see Jerrold G. Van Cise, Religion and Antitrust, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 455, 480-81 (1978)
(arguing that Robinson-Patman reduced arbitrariness in prices by forcing producers and distributors to
rationalize their pricing policies).
44 F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 515-16 (3d ed. 1990).
45 EARL W. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER: A GUIDE TO THE LAW AGAINST PRICE
DISCRIMINATION 10 (2d ed. 1979).
46 Margaret M. Zwisler, Volvo Trucks v. Reeder-Simco: Judicial Activism at the Supreme Court?,
20 ANTITRUST40, 41 (2006).
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vantage to extract better terms from suppliers than its smaller competitors
through price discrimination or buyer power."
Explicit and implicit immunities to antitrust regulation may be in-
cluded in the initial antitrust law and regulations of a country's antitrust
system for public choice reasons. Restrictions on the ability of an antitrust
agency to act because of immunities in the antitrust law, or other laws that
provide sole jurisdiction to sector regulators, set up the parameters for anti-
trust regulation in a given market. This limits the ability of antitrust agen-
cies to police against market-distorting behavior that the government cre-
ates or facilitates. One such case of a direct exemption is Singapore's Com-
petition Act of 2004. The Act's prohibitions against anticompetitive con-
duct do not apply to the government, any statutory body, or person acting
on behalf of the government." Moreover, the Act creates a number of sector
exclusions, such as for postal, rail, and cargo services.49 In other areas,
competition oversight of sector-specific businesses has been exempted
(e.g., telecoms, media, and energy). Given the political power of some of
the state-owned enterprises in Singapore (via the government holding com-
pany Temasek Holding Pte., which, as a sovereign wealth fund, also bought
a stake in Merrill Lynch in late 2008) and the problems of public choice in
regulation, such exemptions have the potential for significant anticompeti-
tive effect.5" In countries that are far less open to competition, such as
China, a similar pattern is emerging. Article 7 of the new Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law51 creates immunities from antitrust regulation for state
owned enterprises in "strategic" sectors, which include such economic driv-
ers as aviation, banking, electricity, oil, railroads, and telecommunica-
tions.52
The political process may, after adopting an antitrust law, add various
immunities from antitrust coverage for favored industries and sectors, for
reasons of public choice. The U.S. experience, in which immunities have
had significant staying power, exemplifies how difficult it is to get a do-
47 Joel B. Dirlam & Alfred E. Kahn, Antitrust Law and the Big Buyer: Another Look at the A&P
Case, 60 J. POL. EcON. 118, 118-19 (1952) (analyzing the buyer power of A&P). The effect of Robin-
son-Patman in its early years (1936-1959) also primarily impacted the food sector, with 87 percent of
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") orders regarding unlawful brokerage dealing with food products.
CORWIN D. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW: A REVIEW OF EXPERIENCE 74 (1959).
48 Competition Act 2004, Bill No. 22/2004, at § 33(4) (Sing.).
49 Id. 5-7, Third Schedule.
50 Among Temasek's holdings are critical players in the Singaporean economy such as Singapore
Airlines, Singapore Telecommunications, DBS Bank, and hotelier Raffles Holdings.
51 Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), available at http://china.org.cn/
government/laws/2009-02/1 0/content_17254169.htm.
52 Eleanor M. Fox, An Anti-Monopoly Law for China-Scaling the Walls of Government Re-
straints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 173 (2008) (providing an analysis of antitrust public restraints in China).
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mestic legislature to rein in these exemptions.5 3 A statutorily embedded
system of immunities makes remedying such conduct difficult because fa-
vored interest groups will lobby hard to keep those immunities.54 Indeed,
such preferences strengthen existing interest groups, and can even create
additional interest groups, with a vested interest in the continued regulatory
creep of such immunity.55
The history of the Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act of 1980 pro-
vides an example of a rent-seeking immunity enacted after passage of an
antitrust law. The Act authorized the elimination of intrabrand competition
of soft drinks within a bottler's territory.56 The Act was a legislative re-
sponse to FTC litigation against soft drink bottlers in which the use of ex-
clusive territories by bottlers was found to be anticompetitive. In the FTC
case, bottlers limited intrabrand competition in service territories.57 As a
response to the FTC decision, which declared the bottlers' exclusive fran-
chise arrangements illegal, special interests worked to pass national legisla-
tion to use government to shield this conduct through the Act. 8
The legislature is not the only institution that suffers from public
choice concerns. It is endemic to all institutions. 9 However, unlike other
institutions, like the judiciary, the legislature has the ability to significantly
reduce its public choice problems through the creation of sunset provisions
that would cause immunities from antitrust regulation to expire at a certain
53 A number of the U.S. exemptions trace back to the 1930s and some even earlier, such as the
Anti-Hog-Cholera Serum and Hog-Cholera Virus Act. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 852 (1935).
54 MUELLER, supra note 36, at 353.
55 David Currie & John Cubbin, Regulatory Creep and Regulatory Withdrawal: Why Regulatory
Withdrawal is Feasible and Necessary 2 (City Univ. Working Paper, 2002), available at http://www.sta-
ff.city.ac.uk/-sm340/Consulting&Policy/Regulatory%2OWithdrawal%2Report/20020317.pdf ("More
generally,. there is a prevalent view that regulatory creep is inevitable; that regulators will be unwilling
to let go and indeed will be inclined to increase over time the range and scope of what they control.").
56 For a detailed description of the politics involved in the enactment of this legislation, see Am.
Antitrust Inst., Comments of the American Antitrust Institute Working Group on Immunities and Ex-
emptions 3 (2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/publicstudies-fr28902/immunities
exemptions~pdf/050715 AAI.pdf. See also ABA, FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM
ANTITRUST LAW 49-50 (2007).
57 In re Coca Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517(1978).
58 The period after the passage of the Act witnessed a flurry of Department of Justice investiga-
tions and convictions of price fixing by bottlers. Not surprisingly, the Act facilitated this collusion.
HAROLD SALTZMAN, ROY LEVY & JOHN C. HILKE, FED. TRADE COMM'N, TRANSFORMATION AND
CONTINUITY: THE U.S. CARBONATED SOFT DRINK BOTrLING INDUSTRY AND ANTITRUST POLICY
SINCE 1980 139 (1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/softdrink/softdrink.pdf.
59 This includes antitrust agencies. David J. Gerber, Transatlantic Economic Governance: The
Domains and Dimensions of Competition Law, in THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC
RELATIONS: CONTINUITY AMID DISCORD, 81, 93 (Mark Pollack & Greg Shaffer eds., 2005); Donald I.
Baker, Antitrust and Politics at the Justice Department, 9 J.L. & POL. 291, 291 (1993) ("Antitrust and
politics are inevitably intertwined, not only in the United States but in any country having an effective
antitrust program."). However, as noted later in this Article, antitrust agencies are less prone to public
choice concems than sector regulators or the legislature.
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set date.6" With sunset provisions, political factions would need to revisit
the political debate to justify the continuation of immunities via the legisla-
tive process. This would increase accountability and most probably reduce
the number of immunities because the true costs of such legislation would
be exposed.6
2. Judicial Immunities
The judiciary may create public restraints and immunize anticompeti-
tive behavior through case law.62 A brief review of the U.S. experience il-
lustrates how judicially-created immunities can be created and expanded in
scope over time.63 For example, the state action exemption is a judicially-
created exemption to antitrust scrutiny, arising from the 1943 case of
Parker v. Brown.64 In Parker, a raisin producer attempted to enjoin en-
forcement of a mandatory California program that controlled the marketing
and sale of agricultural products.65 The effect of Parker was to shield an-
ticompetitive state laws and their private party beneficiaries that fall within
the state action exemption. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,66 the Supreme Court created a two-pronged test for
a private party to determine what accounts for permissible state supervision
and exemption from antitrust scrutiny.67 Under this two-pronged test, a
party must show that its conduct in question is: (1) "clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy;" and (2) "actively supervised by the
60 Such a proposal has support across the scholarly political divide. For a leftist critique of anti-
trust immunities, see DARREN BUSH, GREGORY K. LEONARD & STEPHEN F. Ross, A FRAMEWORK FOR
POLICYMAKERS TO ANALYZE PROPOSED AND EXISTING ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES AND EXEMPTIONS
(2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract id=956597.
61 George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 192-94 (2009).
62 The complexity of the economics of antitrust may overwhelm the judiciary. See, e.g., Michael
R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Eco-
nomic Complexity & Judicial Training on Appeals 6 (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 09-07, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-id= 13119888.
63 These issues are, of course, tied into federalism. State action concerns are not unique to the
United States. EU case law shows deference to Member States and their decision-making. See Richard
Wainwright & Andr6 Bouquet, State Intervention and Action in EC Competition Law, in ANNUAL
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW &
POLICY 2003 551 (Barry Hawk ed., 2004); Case C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v.
AutoritA Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 2003 E.C.R. 1-8055; Femando Castillo de la Torre,
State Action Defence in EC Competition Law, 28 WORLD COMPETITION 407,430 (2005).
64 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943) (involving discrimination within a federal system where 90 per-
cent of raisins were shipped out of state). In this case, local politics favored anticompetitive conduct that
imposed costs on non-voting out-of-staters. Id.
65 Id.
66 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
67 Id. at 105-06.
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[s]tate itself."68 In the twenty-five years since Midcal, the scope of the state
action exemption has grown.
As part of a more general push to combat public restraints, the FTC
recently undertook a comprehensive study of the state action exemption
through a State Action Task Force.69 The State Action Task Force Report
concluded that over time courts have weakened limitations on the doctrine.
Both the "clear articulation" and "active supervision" requirements have
been the subject of varied and controversial interpretation, sometimes re-
sulting in unwarranted expansions of the exemption.7" The criteria for "ac-
tive supervision" remaih unclear. Because of its opaqueness, the active su-
pervision requirement has not adequately limited exemptions under the
state action doctrine.7' There is also some lack of clarity as to the "clear
articulation" prong. One set of cases, particularly those that have reached
the Supreme Court, has interpreted the "clear articulation" prong to allow
states broadly to displace competition as a result of a legislative grant of
general corporate powers.72 The Supreme Court expanded what constitutes
clear articulation. In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,73 the Supreme
Court held that the "clear articulation" test was satisfied when the anticom-
68 Id. at 105 (internal quotation marks purposely omitted).
69 TODD J. ZYwicKI, FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE (2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf The Task Force never questioned
whether there should be any state action exemption, merely how to better limit the exemption. Id. at 3.
The State Action Task Force recommendations suggest a concern that public restraints on trade can
serve anticompetitive ends and need to be circumscribed. Because the state action doctrine rests upon
federalism, actions of the state and its actors are shielded. There is no reason why state action needs to
rest on federalism grounds. The federal government could choose to directly regulate these issues and
take away discretion from the states. The recommendations of the State Action Task Force beg a larger
question. Instead of examining the limitations of an exemption that has anticompetitive results, why not
abolish the exemption? The answer would suggest that public choice concerns limit the FTC's ability to
eliminate this or other exemptions. Public choice significantly circumscribes the ability of an established
competition system, such as that of the United States, from acting against immunities. One can under-
stand why in countries with a more recent transition to liberalization and new antitrust agencies the
possibility of overcoming immunities is much greater.
70 See John T. Delacourt & Todd J. Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving Views on the
Proper Role of Government, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1075, 1087 (2005) (arguing that public choice thinking
has not created a more systematic framework to address state action cases).
71 The State Action Task Force recommends that active supervision be narrowly defined. Active
supervision would entail three requirements: (1) the development of an adequate factual record, includ-
ing notice and an opportunity for critics of the policy to be heard; (2) a written decision on the merits;
and (3) a specific assessment-both qualitative and quantitative-of how the private action comports
with the substantive standards established by the state. ZYWICKJ, supra note 69, at 37.
72 Id. at 26-34. Clear articulation rests on whether "the State as sovereign clearly intends to dis-
place competition in a particular field with a regulatory structure." S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference,
Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 64 (1985); Darren Bush, Mission Creep: Antitrust Exemptions and
Immunities as Applied to Deregulated Industries, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 761, 767 (noting that some recent
cases at the district court level apply a less broad foresecability standard).
73 471 U.S. 34(1985).
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petitive conduct was the "foreseeable result" of a state statute. This foresee-
able result standard has led courts to allow significant anticompetitive be-
havior to be shielded through "clear articulation" by either a general state
authority or through a broad regulatory regime.74
3. Indirect Immunities-Regulatory Creep of Sector Regulators
Sector regulation may create an explicit75 or implicit76 immunity from
antitrust regulation. This mechanism of public restraints is different from
legislative public restraints because in sector regulation, regulators create
restraints through administrative law. The extent of sector regulation and
the decision-making of sector regulators define the parameters for business
regulation. Thus, a sector regulator that sets high barriers to entry affects
the competitiveness of a market and the ability of antitrust regulation to
function as a policy tool to correct market failures.77
Countries may choose sector regulator oversight over antitrust law for
reasons of public choice. Sector regulation may be more open to manipula-
tion and capture by interest groups, resulting in the creation of more public
restraints. Because in some cases sector regulators may have preceded anti-
trust agencies, there may be a sense among some sector regulators of a turf
war over control of regulation in that sector. Sector regulators may see an
antitrust agency as a potential threat for funding and prestige. This threat of
competing regulators may cause a sector administrator to seek greater con-
trol (and more power and funding) over its regulated industry.78 Such sector
regulators might take steps to limit the role that an antitrust agency might
take in that particular sector.
Some sector regulation historically has served a market replacement
rather than market facilitation function.79 Sector regulators therefore still
74 Some district court level cases take an alternative view on foreseeability. See, e.g., Capital City
Cab Serv., Inc. v. Susquehanna Area Reg'l Airport Auth., 470 F. Supp. 2d 462, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
75 See the appendices in INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK [ICN], INTERRELATIONS
BETWEEN ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY AUTHORITIES: REPORT TO THE THIRD ICN ANNUAL
CONFERENCE (2004) [hereinafter ICN, INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY
AUTHORITIES], available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference
3rd seoul_2004/aers sg3_seoul.pdf.
76 See, e.g., Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 165 (1922); Gordon v. N.Y. Stock
Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 691 (1975).
77 ICN, INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY AUTHORITIES, supra note 75,
at 5.
78 WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 195-223
(1971); Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor & Roland van Gaalen, Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative
Authority: A Model of Deception and Monitoring in Budgeting, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1041, 1042
(1985).
79 See, e.g., EKATERINA MARKOVA, LIBERALIZATION AND REGULATION OF THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF RUSSIA 81-82 (2009).
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may focus on industry concerns, rather than on the competitive process, as a
means of improving societal welfare. Additionally, because sector regula-
tors focus on a specific industry, as repeat players they are more prone than
antitrust agencies to capture by those in a particular industry with a vested
interest in sector outcomes. This repeat play of actors within a narrow band
of interests may make sector regulators easier to capture than antitrust en-
forcers, since the latter's oversight exposes them to many industries and
interest groups, while the former must deal with the focused attentions of
the same interest groups over and over. Particularly in the developing
world, the low pay of sector regulators increases the likelihood of capture.0
In addition to direct pressure from industry groups, sector regulators may be
prone to specific pressure from legislators interested in that sector, further
exacerbating the problem of capture.8
Sector regulation also may be prone to manipulation by companies
that attempt to game the regulatory system. Such gaming may occur when,
because of concurrent sector and antitrust regulation, anticompetitive be-
havior results from regulatory schemes that allow for subsidies from a regu-
lated market (sector regulator) to an unregulated market (antitrust). An-
ticompetitive cross-subsidization allows monopoly firms in the regulated
sector to raise the cost of rivals from the unregulated sector or to price be-
low marginal cost for a sustained period to drive out competitors.82 In this
regard, regulated firms may benefit from cross subsidies because inputs of
the regulated network may be used to compete in the unregulated sector,
whereas the cost is allocated to the regulated sector.
The example of telecommunications services in Taiwan suggests how
a regulated firm can game the regulatory system for anticompetitive ends
through public restraints. In 1999, the Taiwanese state-owned telecommu-
nication incumbent, Chunghwa Telecom, introduced a service that allowed
users to have call answer, call transfer, voicemail, collect call capacity, and
information management. 3 It branded this service "099 service." At the
time, Chunghwa held a government-designated monopoly (i.e., an antitrust
immunity) in fixed telephony, but competed against five companies in mo-
bile telephony. Pricing of 099 was almost half the cost of competitor serv-
80 JAMES R. BARTH, GERARD CAPRIO, JR. & Ross LEVINE, RETHINKING BANK REGULATION:
TILL ANGELS GOVERN 34 (2006).
81 See Todd J. Zywicki, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Competition Policy
and Regulatory Reform: Means and Ends, Address at the Competition Policy Research Center, Fair
Trade Commission of Japan Inaugural Symposium 4 (Nov. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/031120zywickijapanspeech.pdf; Mariana Mota Prado, The Chal-
lenges and Risks of Creating Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Cautionary Tale from Brazil, 41
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435 passim (2008).
82 See, e.g., World Bank, Telecommunications Regulation Handbook, Module 5, 17-23 (2000),
available at http://www.infodev.org/en/Publication.22.html.
83 OECD, ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN REGULATED SECTORS 2 (2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1 1/23/34339796.pdf.
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ices.84 This was not a function of superior technology or business acumen.
Rather, it was a function of Chunghwa's ability to cross subsidize from its
fixed telephone monopoly (where it could charge a premium) to the mobile
sector where it competed with other firms. This policy caused Chunghwa to
increase fixed line local rates for local 099 calls by 900 percent, while it
decreased local to mobile rates for 099 calls by 40 percent.85
II. INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES TO ADDRESS PUBLIC RESTRAINTS
A. Institutional Choice
This Article undertakes a comparative institutional analysis of the
costs and benefits of various institutional alternatives to combat public re-
straints.86 To determine which institution is the best suited vis-a-vis other
institutions to solve a problem, such as public restraints, one must compare
institutional choices.87 Public restraints affect numerous participants across
84 Id.
85 Id. Both telecom and antitrust agencies ultimately played a role to remedy the anticompeitive
behavior. Id. at 4-5.
86 Scholars ascribe different meanings to the terms "institution" and "comparative institutional
analysis." See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2001); THRAINN EGGERTSSON, IMPERFECT INSTITUTIONS: POSSIBILITIES
AND LIMITS OF REFORM (2005); THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter
W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS (John L. Campbell & Ove K. Pederson eds., 2001); EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF
RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS (1997); NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: A GUIDEBOOK (ltric
Brousseau & Jean-Michel Glachant eds., 2008). The present Article defines institutions according to
North, as the governance structures of formal rules, informal norms, their organizational structure, and
the ways in which these structures enforce governance. Douglass C. North, Economic Performance
Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 360 (1994). By comparative institutional analysis, this Article
uses Williamson's conceptualization. WILLIAMSON, supra, at 2 (offering "an examination of the com-
parative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under alternative governance
structures").
87 In a previous article, I developed a theoretical framework of comparative institutional analysis
of antitrust and applied it to the issues of antitrust that had the most direct day-to-day impact in interna-
tional antitrust-mergers, cartels, and market access. I concluded that the strength of soft law organiza-
tions, and in particular the International Competition Network ("ICN"), was the best institutional choice
to push for increased effectiveness to address international antitrust issues. Sokol, supra note 5, at 118.
A comparative institutional analysis of antirust public restraints creates a particular problem with the
previous comparative analysis. Because the current Article addresses a specific subset of issues within
international antitrust, public restraints, there is the possibility that a comparative institutional analysis
that focuses merely on this subset of issues may yield a different set of institutional alternatives than a
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many jurisdictions because of their global impact. This dynamic renders
any one institutional solution imperfect. Instead, any potential institutional
choice is a choice among the least bad alternatives. The global problem of
public restraints requires a comparative institutional analysis at both hori-
zontal levels (interplay between domestic institutions and interplay between
international institutions) and vertical levels (interplay between domestic
and international institutions). This Section explains the dynamics and in-
teractions of these institutional choices.
Domestic level institutional choice allows for more localized ap-
proaches that adjust to the contours of regulatory and socio-economic situa-
tions at the country level." "This may reduce information asymmetries be-
tween the regulator" and firms that exist with international institutional
choices.89 On the one hand, it may be easier to overcome transaction costs
at the international level than at the domestic level for global problems.9"
International institutions may allow for coordination to overcome interna-
tional antitrust public restraints. On the other hand, international institutions
may create a global set of standards that may cause more harm than good, if
standards are set too low or if capture occurs globally. Among international
institutions, both hard law and soft law international institutional alterna-
tives require domestic compliance. But, as discussed below, compliance
functions in different ways for hard and soft law.
comparative institutional analysis of international antitrust issues generally. Yet, the significant impact
of public restraints and the current regulatory gap to address its effects justifies a comparative institu-
tional analysis even at this more limited level for public restraints.
88 Comparative institutional analysis at the domestic level, when done across countries in the
aggregate, makes some generalizations about the strengths and weaknesses of courts, agencies and the
legislative process. These generalizations lead to some country-level imprecision. However, to address a
global issue such as public restraints, there is a need to make more general descriptive and/or explana-
tory inferences based on empirical information about institutions around the world. For designing such a
social inquiry, see GARY KING, ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY:
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 3-32 (1994).
89 Warrick Smith, Regulating Utilities: Thinking About Location Questions 4 (World Bank Sum-
mer Workshop on Mkt. Inst., 2000), available at http://rru.worldbank.orglDocuments/PapersLinks/
regulatingutilities thinkingabout locationquestions.doc.
90 Andrew Moravcsik, A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Coop-
eration, 53 INT'L ORG. 267, 301 (1999).
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DIAGRAM A. INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES FOR ANTITRUST










Diagram A provides a graphical overview of the various institutional
choices for overcoming the negative effects of public restraint antitrust im-
munities. Choosing any of these institutions requires an analysis based on
the costs and benefits of these institutions relative to each other. On the x-
axis is a choice between domestic and international institutions. Domestic
level institutional choice, regardless of the institution, is a decentralized
approach to resolving the international effects of public restraints. Interna-
tional institutional alternatives must be considered to solve public restraints
because public restraints have an international dimension. Moreover, the
interaction between domestic and international institutions is part of a two-
level game.9' As countries make the choice for an international solution,
this may lead to increased international rule-making and coordination.
However, such activity requires acceptance and implementation at the do-
mestic level. Thus, there is an institutional question of how to coordinate
across domestic and international institutional choices.
On the y-axis is the choice between hard and soft law.92 Hard law re-
lies upon enforceable rules administered by formal adjudication. In con-
trast, soft law requires standards that are not directly enforceable, except by
the informal responses (the sticks of shame sanctions and the carrots of
91 Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L
ORG. 427, 434 (1988).
92 The choices that international organizations make also involve imperfect institutional alterna-
tives. See Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of Interna-
tional Organizations, 53 INT'L ORG. 699, 716-17 (1999).
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praise and commendation) of those countries and agencies that subscribe to
these international norms. Soft law norms are based on lower levels of
commitment, obligation, and/or precision than those found in hard law.93
Proponents of soft law focus on how it develops accepted informal norms
of behavior, which may have more long-lasting effects than more strict
norms of behavior imposed through formal regulation.
There are four domestic hard law institutional choices for addressing
competition issues: courts, antitrust agencies, legislatures, and sector regu-
lators. In the area of international antitrust law, the global hard law institu-
tion is the WTO. Soft law international antitrust organizations include the
OECD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD"), and the International Competition Network ("ICN"). Soft
law in an antitrust context is an institutional choice of international agency-
to-agency cooperation among domestic antitrust agencies. There are no
significant domestic soft law antitrust institutions that shape behavior. An-
other institution does not fit into the two-by-two chart-the market. In lieu
of regulation, it is always possible to rely upon the market either interna-
tionally or domestically. The question of how much to let the market shape
the organization of society is at the core of regulatory decision-making.
B. Domestic Institutional Choices
The complex interaction among domestic institutions creates and con-
strains public restraints in antitrust law. Antitrust law may prove ineffective
to deal with those areas in which the legislature, judiciary, or sector regula-
tors have immunized antitrust-related conduct. Antitrust law also suffers
fiom internal institutional constraints, in which antitrust agencies may
choose inaction at times because of political backlash that a public re-
straints enforcement agenda may create.
1. Legislature
Even though the legislature is the primary creator of public restraints,
it also plays the primary role in liberalizing an economy through regulatory
reform and the elimination of anticompetitive regulations.94 The legislature
93 Dinah Shelton, Introduction to COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 2-4, 10-13 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Kenneth W.
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 434
(2000).
94 The legislative process is one in which legislators work to pursue legislation that they and/or
their constituents desire. The motivation may be ideological and/or may be a function of a legislator's
attempt to win reelection. There is a large existing literature on the motivation and the structure of the
legislative process. See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 36, at 386-405; POSITIVE THEORIES OF
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thus may be an engine of liberalization. In liberalization, a country reduces
its government-imposed barriers to competition. For example, beginning in
the 1970s, the U.S. Congress liberalized a number of sectors, such as en-
ergy, transportation, and financial services. 95 On a global level, the period
of the 1980s and 1990s witnessed unrivaled cross-country regulatory liber-
alization. Countries increasingly abandoned (in part or in whole) centralized
planning and government ownership of companies for private ownership
and market-based economies.96
A market-based economy requires setting up an appropriate regulatory
framework and mechanisms, providing remedies for anticompetitive con-
duct, and eliminating market failures. To facilitate liberalization and to con-
strain retrenchment of previous policies, legislators increasingly have
looked to sector-based regulatory systems and to antitrust law.97 The emerg-
ing empirical record on liberalization suggests that overall this process has
led to increased efficiency.98 Moreover, increased liberalization has led to
increased long-term investment.99
An additional legislative response for reducing public restraints is
trade liberalization.' 0 Increased trade openness may reduce rent-seeking
public restraints because openness creates new constituencies for economic
liberalization.' Increased foreign competition leads to increased institu-
tional quality because firms in a competitive environment become deman-
deurs for improved institutional quality. I0 2
CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS (Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1995); THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman eds., 2006).
95 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 194 (1982).
96 D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-
Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231, 236-
39 (2008).
97 How exactly efforts at reform overcame public choice problems remains under-explored. See
id. at 243 (arguing that international lending institutions and trade agreements contributed to this
change); Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Econ-
omy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 915 (1999) ("Deregulation, there-
fore, may come about only if the distributive consequences to entrenched interest groups and politicians
is large enough to offset the rents they are sacrificing.").
98 William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Stud-
ies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 321, 332-37 (2001).
99 Alberto Alesina et al., Regulation and Investment, 3 J. EUR. ECON. ASS'N 791, 792 (2005).
100 Some countries may be too small to have an antitrust authority. Stefan Voigt, The Economic
Effects of Competition Policy: Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators 20 (Int'l Centre for
Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 20, 2006), available at http://www.isnic.org/ISNlE06/Papers06/
09.3/voigt.pdf.
101 Simon Johnson, Jonathan D. Ostry & Arvind Subramanian, The Prospects for Sustained
Growth in Africa: Benchmarking the Constraints 21 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 07/52,
2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0752.pdf.
102 Quy Toan Do & Andrei A. Levchenko, Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy oflnstitu-
tions, 144 J. ECON. THEORY 1489, 1491 (2008); Andrei A. Levchenko, Institutional Quality and Inter-
national Trade, 74 REV. ECON. STUD. 791, 792 (2007).
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Trade openness can help to address issues of market concentration in a
country (at least in the tradable sector). Market concentration in itself does
not equal market power. 3 However, more highly concentrated markets
may allow firms with a dominant position to have the means by which to
monopolize."° When markets are highly concentrated, firms may use their
market power to create high entry barriers, such as trade barriers. In turn,
such barriers may limit the ability of foreign entry (actual or potential) to
reduce monopolistic practices. 5 Individual firms may create anticompeti-
tive vertical restraints to exclude foreign entrants." 6 In contrast, increased
trade openness may increase competition and reduce market concentration
in the tradable sector. 0 7
There are limits to using a trade liberalization/market access approach
in lieu of antitrust regulation. The non-tradable sector of an economy may
remain uncompetitive. Moreover, increased trade does not stop the possibil-
ity that firms may collude with each other to fix price, output, or service
territories.' 8 There is an increasing recognition that trade openness and
liberalization alone cannot remedy the potential for anticompetitive con-
duct. For instance, the two most liberalized and trade-open jurisdictions in
the world, Hong Kong and Singapore, who for so long felt that the market
alone could remedy any possible anticompetitive practices, have begun to
introduce antitrust laws. 9 To ensure the contestability of even the most
liberalized national markets to trade, antitrust regulation serves a compli-
103 Simeon Djankov & Bernard Hoekman, Conditions of Competition and Multilateral Surveil-
lance, 21 WORLD ECON. 1109, 1116 (1998).
104 Wendy Carlin, Mark Schaffer & Paul Seabright, A Minimum of Rivalry: Evidence from Transi-
tion Economies on the Importance of Competition for Innovation and Growth, 3 CONTRIBUTIONS ECON.
ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1, 17 (2004) available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1284
&context-bejeap (subscription required) (finding that where firms are more likely to be monopolies,
they are less likely to innovate and more likely to have weaker growth than firms that face business
rivalry).
105 See Oliver Budzinski, Toward an International Governance of Transborder Mergers? Competi-
tion Networks and Institutions between Centralism and Decentralism, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 4
(2003).
106 Stephen F. Hamilton & Kyle Stiegert, Vertical Coordination, Antitrust Law, and International
Trade, 43 J.L. & ECON. 143, 150-51 (2000).
107 Todd Mitton, Institutions and Concentration, 86 J. DEv. ECON. 367, 368 (2008) (noting that
this is particularly an issue in smaller economies that by definition have more highly concentrated mar-
kets).
108 Julian L. Clarke & Simon J. Evenett, The Deterrent Effects of National Anticartel Laws: Evi-
dence from the International Vitamins Cartel, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 689, 697 (2003); Margaret Leven-
stein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels and Developing Countries: Economic
Effects and Implicationsfor Competition Policy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 819 (2004).
109 MARK WILLIAMS, COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW IN CHINA, HONG KONG AND TAIWAN 48-
49, 71, 264 (2005); Burton Ong, The Origins, Objectives and Structure of Competition Law in Singa-
pore, 29 WORLD COMPETITION 269,270 (2006).
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mentary role to trade liberalization in ensuring that private restraints do not
replace public restraints."'
As the prime mover of economic liberalization, the legislature faces
structural impediments more severe than other institutions. The problem of
time inconsistency, in which the make-up of legislators change, may lead to
policies that deviate from those of the initial enacting coalition, and makes
the legislature less effective than other alternatives in preserving the gains
of liberalization."' Checks and balances are fewer in a legislature than for
independent actors, such as administrative agencies or the judiciary."2 This
makes legislatures relatively more prone to capture. Moreover, legislation is
often written in broad, imprecise terms. The vagueness of legislation leaves
it to agencies and courts to decide the scope of legislation."3
2. Sector Regulators
Sector regulation is a potential domestic agency-level response to pub-
lic restraints. Sector regulation generally involves ex ante enforcement."l4 In
some cases, the goal of sector regulation is to address market failure
110 Bernard Hoekman & Hiau Looi Kee, Competition Law as Market Discipline, (2002), available
at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=320282; Leon Brittan, Address at the World
Competition Forum in Davos, Switzerland: A Framework for International Competition (Feb. 3, 1992).
111 David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Divided Government and the Design of Administrative
Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test, 58 J. POL. 373, 379-81 (1996). To be sure, the nature
of legislative relations also depends on the system of govemment. The particular dynamics may look
different in presidential versus parliamentary systems.
112 Markus M.L. Crepaz, Global, Constitutional, and Partisan Determinants of Redistribution in
Fifteen OECD Countries, 34 COMP. POL. 169, 174 (2002).
113 A principal-agent problem may develop in legislation in which the agent (courts or agencies)
may pursue goals different from that of the principal. KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK,
ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 358-68 (1997).
114 DAMIEN GERADIN & MICHEL KERF, CONTROLLING MARKET POWER IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 17 (2003). The rationale for utilizing sector regulation over antitrust regulation
is that sector regulation has greater expertise than antitrust to address sector-specific competition issues.
OECD, The Relationship Between Competition Authorities and Sectoral Regulators 4, OECD Doc.
OECD DAF/COMP/GF(2005)2 (Feb. 2, 2005), available at http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/
en/Publication. 1626.html. For example, in the case of telecommunications, a telecom regulatory regime
is more effective than is an antitrust-based regime in technical areas such as number portability or in
setting effective interconnection rates. Likewise, antitrust seems less well suited than telecom regulators
to pursue structural remedies such as vertical separation, universal service obligations, or merger review
where no competition previously existed. Michel Kerf, Isabel Neto & Damien G6radin, Controlling
Market Power: Balancing Antitrust and Sector Regulation in Telecoms, WORLD BANK PUB. POL'Y J.,
June 2005, at 3-4, available at http://rru.worldbank.org/publicpolicyjoumal.com (providing case studies
of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, and the United Kingdom). In contrast, antitrust law
may be applied more consistently across a number of different areas of the economy. This consistency
may provide for better business decision-making in terms of business planning, as opposed to having
different standards for competition depending on the particular sector of the economy.
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through market-facilitating measures."5 However, in many countries sector
regulators have their origin in a market replacement function rather than in
a market facilitation function. These sector regulators may have difficulty
in making a transition to a market facilitation function because of their his-
tory, past interactions with the legislature, and interactions with those com-
panies that they regulate.
Sector regulators are more likely to have multiple missions than anti-
trust agencies. Whereas efficiency may, in practice, be the sole mission of
antitrust regulation, sector agencies may need to balance efficiency con-
cerns with the preservation of competitors who provide diversity of number
of firms or, in some instances, preserve a diversity of viewpoints." 6 Sector
regulation may also include requirements for the supply and/or quality of
service, depending on the sector. Strategic factors may play a role in how
sector regulators choose to regulate, given overall political economy con-
cerns. Local firms in network industries may be a large portion of a local
stock exchange. Regulation that encourages competition may negatively
affect a local stock market. In countries in which pension plans have a large
local stock market component, the potential economic consequence of
greater efficiency that reduces the stock market value of a monopolist may
be significant."7
Sector regulators may be less inclined to take on risk."8 Risk averse
behavior is more predictable than behavior that requires risk taking by
managers or regulators. It allows sector regulators to maintain their political
capital." 9 This is a public choice problem because innovation by agencies
can lead to political backlash. Funding may be cut as retribution for policies
that create costs to entrenched interest groups, even when such policies are
consumer welfare enhancing. A second element to risk aversion by regula-
tors is that regulators may not want to promote structural reforms that
would expand competition in the sector and have the market serve as the
default institution. By increasing competition, the size, role, and responsi-
115 Jean-Jacques Laffont, Competition, Information, and Development 6 (Annual World Bank
Conference on Dev. Econ., 1998), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 1NTABCDEWASH
INGTON I 998/Resources/laffont.pdf.
116 Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger Standards Protect
the Public Interest?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 371, 394 (2006). What antitrust means by claims of efficiency is
still open to debate. See, e.g., Karl Aiginger, et al., Do American and European Industrial Organization
Economists Differ?, 19 REV. INDUS. ORG. 383, 384 (2001); Eleanor M. Fox, What Is Harm to Competi-
tion? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 372 (2002).
117 Manabu Asai & Tsunemasa Shiba, The Japanese Stock Market and the Macroeconomy: An
Empirical Investigation, 2 FIN. ENGINEERING & JAPAN. MKTS. 259, 259 (1995); Gene Park, The Politi-
cal-Economic Dimension of Pensions: The Case of Japan, 17 GOVERNANCE 549, 561 (2004).
118 Sam Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amend-
ments, 81 J. PO. ECON. 1049, 1086 (1973).
1 19 Zywicki, supra note 81, at 9.
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bility of the regulator could be diminished as the market (and antitrust as a
check on market malfunctions) takes over more oversight functions. 21
3. Antitrust Agencies
A focus on using antitrust agencies to combat public restraints is an in-
stitutional choice for a market-based approach, with antitrust regulation as
the backstop to police against market failure.' 2' The central questions that
antitrust law addresses are whether and when to intervene and when to
leave economic regulation to the market. Antitrust law may intervene ex
ante in merger review to block potentially anticompetitive mergers. 22 Anti-
trust law also may intervene ex post when a firm exercises monopoly power
or when finns collude to raise prices.
For antitrust law to be effective, the state must create mechanisms to
constrain itself from manipulating the system to its own advantage and that
of interest groups. 123 Yet, as the discussion about other domestic institutions
illustrates, the state has a number of weaknesses in reducing public re-
straints. Antitrust agencies have limited capacity to affect change, even with
increased help from soft law organizations.'24 This institutional limitation
reduces antitrust agencies' effectiveness in addressing public restraints and
even affects outcomes where antitrust law acts against private firm an-
ticompetitive conduct.
120 Darryl Biggar & Alberto Heimler, An Increasing Role for Competition in the Regulation of
Banks 20 (ICN Antitrust in Regulated Sectors Subgroup 1, 2005), available at
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/medialibrary/conference4th-bonn 2005/Banking-
AnlncreasingRoleForCompetition.pdf.
121 C~cile Aubert & Jean-Jacques Laffont, Multiregulation in Developing Countries 44 (Back-
ground Paper for the World Dev. Report, 2002); Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and
Regulation 16 (John M. Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 312 (2d series), 2006), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=937020.
122 Some mergers do get challenged ex post but the vast majority of merger inquiry occurs before
the merger has been consummated. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., ANTITRUST DIVISION
POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/205108.htm (outlining the "guiding principles" that lead the Division to challenge mergers in
advance of their consummation).
123 Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of
Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 808
(1989) (discussing the role of the state and economic activity).
124 Michael Nicholson, D. Daniel Sokol & Kyle W. Stiegert, Technical Assistance for Law and
Economics: An Empirical Analysis in Antitrust/Competition Policy I (Food Sys. Research Group, Univ.
of Wis.-Madison, Working Paper Series FSWP2006-07, 2006), available at http://www.aae.wisc.edu/
fsrg/publications/WP2006-07.pdf.
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To combat public restraints, effective antitrust regulation requires co-
ordination among different parts of government.'25 Consequently, the coor-
dination and political costs for agencies that combat public restraints are
high. The pragmatic approach taken by many young antitrust agencies is to
focus on the "low hanging fruit" of antitrust regulation where effective re-
sults are easier to achieve. This entails an initial focus on cartel enforce-
ment and basic competition advocacy. Once an agency gains sufficient ex-
pertise and experience in this area, it can add merger review and vertical
restraints to its enforcement agenda. Only after an agency masters these
areas will it engage in competition advocacy in the area of regulation.126 For
many agencies, it may be many years before they reach the final stage of
advocacy of the elimination of regulatory barriers that include immunities.
These priorities appear to be the dominant views held by the antitrust estab-
lishment.'27 Given an increasing international focus on hard-core cartel en-
forcement by domestic agencies, the resources given to combating public
sector restraints may be rather limited in young antitrust agencies.
Such an environment presents a limited ability for antitrust agencies to
combat public restraints through domestic antitrust institutions. Thus, even
though public restraints may be important, within the traditional path of
antitrust agency development, they are not a priority.'28 By the time domes-
tic agencies develop the ability to attack public restraints, including immu-
nities, these restraints may take on a life of their own, with strong interest
groups attached to their preservation and expansion. This suggests that the
lag time for a purely domestic enforcement of public restraints creates sig-
nificant harm both domestically and abroad, as the restraints may grow over
time.
125 Michal S. Gal, The Ecology of Antitrust Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in
Developing Countries (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 02-03, 2004),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-665181. This is not to suggest that antitrust systems are close to the
appropriate level of cooperation and coordination. For example, the U.S. system is comprised of fifty-
one state attorneys general, two federal antitrust agencies, private litigants, sector regulators, a non-
antitrust specialized judiciary, and legislators.
126 Robert Anderson & Freddric Jenny, Competition Policy, Economic Development and the Possi-
ble Role of a Multilateral Framework on Competition Policy: Insights from the WTO Working Group on
Trade and Competition Policy, in COMPETITION POLICY tN EAST ASIA 61, 66 (Erlinda M. Medalla ed.,
2005); Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to
the General Council 51, No. WTJWGTCP/2 (Dec. 8, 1998), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/WGTCP/2.doc.
127 Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Intellec-
tual Property and Competition: Four Principles for Encouraging Innovation, Address Before the Digital
Americas 2006 Meeting (Apr. 11, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
215645.pdf.
128 See, e.g., William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust
Div., North Atlantic Competition Policy: Converging Toward What?, Address at the BIICL Second
Annual International and Comparative Law Conference (May 17, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/224128.htm.
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Antitrust agencies can reduce public restraints through competition
advocacy. 129 Through competition advocacy, antitrust agencies may inter-
vene outside of cases either ex ante or ex post to shape regulation, promote
the organization of a market-oriented economic system, and reduce public
restraints. Domestic competition advocacy by antitrust agencies creates a
counterweight to domestic interest groups. "Antitrust is not a cure for rent-
seeking, but it can make important contributions to addressing the prob-
lem."' 3 ° Competition advocacy can be focused directly towards government
restraints when an antitrust agency makes submissions in administrative
rulemakings or the legislative process to safeguard competitive process.
Competition advocacy takes a number of forms, including direct advocacy,
constituency development, research, and studies.'31 These policies enable
antitrust agencies to advocate against anticompetitive laws and regulations
by unmasking their societal costs.'32 In one recent example, the FTC
authored a report on the U.S. Postal Service that demonstrated that both
federal and state laws apply more favorably to the Postal Service than to its
private competitors. The FTC advocated eliminating the disparate treat-
ment. '33
While government agencies, private companies, and industries have
the resources to spend on lobbying, consumers lack the resources to under-
take such advocacy on their own. Where these interest groups create an-
ticompetitive regulation through immunities, anticompetitive legislation
and regulation are placed beyond the reach of traditional antitrust enforce-
ment. Competition advocacy creates a role for antitrust agencies in the in-
fluence of other government agencies. Because antitrust agencies have no
direct authority, they are more likely to be able to avoid capture. Antitrust
regulation addresses economy-wide issues, making capture of an antitrust
agency by a particular industry less likely than in the case of sector regula-
tors.'34
129 Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 951, 953 (2008).
130 Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and the Future Develop-
ment of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 368.
131 William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition
Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265,
282-84 (2001); Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Creating a Culture of Competition:
The Essential Role of Competition Advocacy, Address Before the International Competition Network
Panel on Competition Advocacy and Antitrust Authorities (Sept. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/020928naples.shtm.
132 But see Simon J. Evenett, Competition Advocacy: Time for a Rethink, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 495, 500-07 (2006) (examining and critiquing the rationales behind competition advocacy).
133 FED. TRADE COMM'N, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWS THAT APPLY DIFFERENTLY TO THE UNITED
STATES POSTAL SERVICE AND ITS PRIVATE COMPETITORS: A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 10-11 (Dec. 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/01/080116postal.pdf.
134 Biggar & Heimler, supra note 120, at 19-20.
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Nevertheless, antitrust agency advocacy has somewhat limited value.
Limited agency resources constrain advocacy efforts. Antitrust agencies
allocate limited funding for advocacy in part because advocacy work is not
enforcement and politicians that control agency purse strings do not attach
as much value to fighting against anticompetitive harm that was never un-
dertaken than to efforts to end ex post anticompetitive abuses. Moreover,
advocacy work on public restraints may affect antitrust agency funding
because of the potential political backlash, despite the legitimate questions
about government-sponsored programs that benefit special interests at the
expense of consumers.
4. Judiciary
The judiciary plays a critical role in the implementation of competition
through judicial review of antitrust agency determinations.' Through judi-
cial review of agency actions, the judiciary has powers to ensure that
agency actions are upheld and enforced through the collection of penal-
ties.'36 The judiciary's ability to impose effective antitrust remedies goes to
the heart of the judiciary's relative competency to address public restraints.
This task is to undertake analyses and craft remedies that limit public re-
straints and restore competition.
There are limits to the use of the judiciary for antitrust in general and
for public restraints in particular. Considerations of the substantive ability
of adjudicative decision-makers, the dynamics of litigation, and the physi-
cal capacity of adjudication determine the strength or weakness of the adju-
135 William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transi-
tion Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 403, 407 (1997). Another issue of an institutional choice of the
judiciary focuses on who can participate in the judicial process and bring claims. In some countries,
private litigants can bring claims while in most antitrust systems, only government enforcers can bring
antitrust cases before the courts. llya R. Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Public vs. Private Enforcement
of Antitrust Law: A Survey I (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Stanford Law School, Working
Paper No. 335, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=952067 (providing a literature review on
private rights). Private rights of action may work to overcome regulatory capture by taking away discre-
tion from an agency that might choose not to take on politically difficult cases. This may also limit
agency interventions because there is the possibility for private actors to bring novel claims for an-
ticompetitive conduct. However, private rights may lead to too many frivolous and/or strategic lawsuits.
R. Preston McAfee & Nicholas V. Vakkur, The Strategic Abuse of the Antitrust Laws, I J. STRATEGIC
MGMT. EDUC. 1, 3 (2004).; William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Com-
petition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247, 247-48 (1985); William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Private Antitrust
Enforcement: The New Learning, 28 J.L. & ECON. 405, 412-13 (1985). In countries that address only
private restraints of trade through their antitrust laws, such as the United States, private rights cannot
attack public restraints.
136 ICN, CAPACITY BUILDING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: BUILDING CREDIBLE COMPETITION
AUTHORITIES IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES 36 (2003).
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dicative process.'37 The judiciary of a country may not be well-versed in the
core concepts of antitrust and economic law.'38 Cross-country experience
suggests that courts have limits in their ability to adjudicate highly technical
regulatory issues.'39 A system in which the judiciary acts as a bottleneck to
enforcement creates a situation which effectively condones anticompetitive
conduct. Developing judicial expertise in economic law in general, and
antitrust law specifically, is important to ensure appropriate enforcement of
the development of a functioning, market-based legal infrastructure.
Antitrust litigation produces regulatory uncertainty because different
courts may rule inconsistently with the same set of facts. Anecdotal evi-
dence indicates that when courts do not understand complex antitrust is-
sues, they rule based on a highly procedural formalism. 4 ° These problems
of procedural formalism in antitrust decisions create particular concerns in
conduct cases or with regard to penalties for conduct, regardless of the ori-
gin of the legal system. 4' For example, in New Zealand, telecommunica-
tions regulation focused on a general antitrust solution in conjunction with
courts rather than with sector regulation.'42 In a case involving interconnec-
tion rates within telecommunications between the incumbent provider and a
new entrant for access to the local loop, the case took five years to decide,
with significant procedural delay.'43 The lack of the New Zealand judicial
system's understanding of the complex pricing issues and methodologies
for interconnection underlying the case meant that the conflicting court
decisions left little certainty-none of the courts came up with a specific
interconnection price. This enabled the incumbent Telecom Corporation to
maintain its monopoly position, and it left the victims of its anticompetitive
behavior without any effective means of redress.'4 4 A similar problem oc-
curred in Chile, where the Chilean Supreme Court recently overruled the
Chilean Competition Tribunal in cases regarding tacit collusion based on
procedural rather than substantive grounds, and where it seemed apparent
that the Supreme Court did not understand the antitrust issues. 4
137 NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF
RIGHTS 35 (2001).
138 ICN, Competition and the Judiciary 19 (ICN Competition Policy Implementation Working
Group, 2007), available at http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_
6th moscow 2007/12ReportontheCompetitoinandtheJudiciary.pdf [hereinafter ICN, Competition and
the Judiciary]; Baye & Wright, supra note 62, at 6.
139 Aubert & Laffont, supra note 121, at 44.
140 ICN, Competition and the Judiciary, supra note 138, at 17.
141 Id. at 4.
142 GERADIN & KERF, supra note 114, at 119-62.
143 id.
144 Carl Blanchard, Telecommunications Regulation in New Zealand: Light-handed Regulation and
the Privy Council's Judgment, 19 TELECOMM. POL'Y 465, 472-73 (1995).
145 Elina Cruz & Sebastian Zarate, Building Trust in Antitrust: The Chilean Case, in COMPETITION
LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 157, 168, 178 (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009).
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As part of competition advocacy, antitrust agencies try to limit judicial
overreach by training the judiciary and by producing briefs in litigation that
stress the importance of a limited judicial reach of decisions. Construing
legislation should be approached as a public choice problem. According to
Judge Frank Easterbrook, legislation reflects a particular bargain and not
more.'46 A narrow construction of an exemption takes into consideration the
public choice view that interest groups can contort the legislative process to
extract rents from legislation. If courts around the world followed the ad-
vice of Easterbrook, there would be fewer judicially-created public re-
straints.'47 However, the history of public restraints suggests that many
courts take an approach opposite to that advocated by Easterbrook.
C. International Institutional Choices
The limited ability of domestic institutions to effectively address pub-
lic restraints suggests the potential importance of international institutional
alternatives. To address problems that affect multiple jurisdictions, coun-
tries should create international cooperative solutions.'48 International insti-
tutions may also be better suited to create domestic compliance through
norm creation and to overcome domestic political economy concerns that
allow for the creation and preservation of antitrust immunities. Moreover,
because of the amount of time it takes young agencies to become effective
at competition advocacy, the scope of the harm of public restraint immuni-
ties may justify greater internationalization of solutions.
1. Soft Law
Antitrust soft law focuses on greater harmonization of national laws
through international institutions using norm creation.'49 Because of their
non-binding nature, soft law institutions may allow for greater flexibility
146 Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 46
(1984) ("When a court observes that Congress propelled Group X part way to its desired end, it cannot
assist Group Xfarther along the journey without undoing the structure of the deal.").
147 J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN 3-4 (2003) (suggesting that judges may not be insulated
politically in their decision-making, making them subject them to capture).
148 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 17-18 (1960). For Coasian formal-
izations of federalism to overcome state problems in bargaining, see Steven G. Calabresi, "A Govern-
ment of Limited and Enumerated Powers ": In Defense ofUnited States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752,
784-85 (1995); Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 935
(1997).
149 Although antitrust norms are not entirely dependent on international institutions, without such
soft law institutions these antitrust norms would not have spread nearly as fast.
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than international hard law. 5 ' To a larger extent than hard law, soft law
relies on domestic institutions for compliance. 5 ' Without effective domestic
enforcement, soft law is not effective in creating commitments that coun-
tries will undertake and enforce. Soft law, therefore, must respond to the
limitations of the domestic environments in which it operates, the better to
set an agenda and achieve results. In the antitrust setting specific to public
restraints, soft law helps improve the capacity of antitrust agencies to iden-
tify anticompetitive behavior, to successfully bring cases, and to undertake
competition advocacy.
Two forms of soft law institutions impact antitrust regulation: trans-
governmental and transnational institutions. Transgovernmentalism allows
for international interaction at the sub-state level between administrative
agencies across jurisdictions.'52 In transgovernmentalism, regulatory agen-
cies establish common practices and norms, which they then diffuse domes-
tically. There are two global transgovernmental organizations in interna-
tional antitrust law, the OECD and UNCTAD, discussed infra. The transna-
tional structure includes agency level decision-makers along with non-
governmental stakeholders.'53 These stakeholders include academics, mem-
bers of the business community, and civil society groups. Among antitrust
institutions, the ICN (as detailed in the next section) uses a transnational
organizational structure. Transnational participation by non-governmental
stakeholders may reduce the cost of information more than transgovern-
mental structures because the broad group of stakeholders can provide input
and guidance to addressing the problems of public restraints. In these cir-
cumstances, users of antitrust law can help to shape the regulation and en-
forcement of anticompetitive conduct including public restraints.'54
Soft law institutions create compliance through the benchmarking of
norms. In benchmarking, members of an organization will compare their
respective regulatory systems and determine those elements in which there
is consensus as to effective approaches within the accepted "benchmarked"
norms. Put differently, this process of benchmarking allows for the creation
of "better" practices and implementation by antitrust agencies.155 Bench-
150 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT'L ORG. 421, 434 (2000).
151 Eleanor M. Fox, Global Problems in a World of National Law, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 11, 13
(1999).
152 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184-86 (1997).
153 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Introduction to BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-
STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 3 (Thomas Risse-Kappen
ed., 1995).
154 Sokol, supra note 5, at 107.
155 Better practices may be a preferable term as practices evolve over time. With advances in
thinking and a number of iterations of better approaches, new approaches may emerge that may be more
effective. See generally William E. Kovacic, Achieving Better Practices in the Design of Competition
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marking sets the standard for acceptable behavior and approaches for anti-
trust agencies. It also provides flexibility for particular agencies to fit within
a larger norm while preserving their ability to act given their own unique
legal and institutional settings.
Because soft law can be more ambiguous than hard law, it is easier to
reach acceptance based on general principals. This same ambiguity may
allow for greater compromise among actors and encourage more coopera-
tion among agencies. For example, in antitrust regulation, benchmarking on
public restraints might focus on issues such as ensuring transparency of
regulations, applying sound economic analysis in enforcement decisions,
and ensuring that the antitrust law allows for effective remedies for an-
ticompetitive behavior against public restraints.
Compliance with soft law norms and benchmarking sometimes re-
quires the domestic legislature to play a role to change laws to conform to
international norms. The international mandate for change based on interna-
tionally established better practices may help to enact such reforms domes-
tically. Soft law effectiveness may also have an effect on hard law. If soft
law creates increased domestic compliance, this enables better implementa-
tion of hard law, or creates higher standards for hard law based on the
emerging norms.'56 As economic learning in antitrust develops, soft law
allows for integration of this learning by member agencies and non-agency
actors in domestic antitrust systems.'57 Through this process, shared norms
may be redefined through additional iterations of discussions on implemen-
tation with new approaches.'
In developing accepted informal norms of behavior, soft law has had
long-lasting effects in antitrust regulation. Antitrust norm creation primarily
has focused on cartels and mergers, where the primary problem is one of
coordination across antitrust authorities.'59 The norms created focus on es-
Policy Institutions, in ON THE MERITS: CURRENT ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 195 (Paul
Lugard & Leigh Hancher eds., 2005).
156 Jon Birger Skjarseth, Olav Schram Stokke & Jorgen Wettestad, Soft Law, Hard Law, and
Effective Implementation of International Environmental Norms, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Aug. 2006, at
104, 105 (2006).
157 William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Think-
ing, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 58 (2000) (arguing that antitrust is evolutionary).
158 Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Active Welfare, Experimental Governance, Pragmatic
Constitutionalism: The New Transformation of Europe 2 (Draft Prepared for the Int'l Conference of the
Hellenic Presidency of the EU, 2003), available at http://www.eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/Papers/EUC/
zeitlinSabel3.pdf.
159 OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Car-
tels 2, OECD Doc. C(98)35/FINAL (1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/4/2350130.
pdf, OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Merger Review, OECD Doc. C(2005)34 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/41/40537528.pdf; OECD, Best Practices for the Formal Ex-
change of Information Between Competition Authorities in Hard Core Cartel Investigations 2 (Oct.
2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/I/33/35590548.pdf; ICN, Recommended Practices for
Merger Notification Procedures 29 (ICN Conference, Sept. 2002), available at
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tablishing benchmarks for practices on the process of merger control, in-
cluding issues of timing and transparency. In cartels, norms include identi-
fying cartel behavior and setting up coordination mechanisms across coun-
tries. In both mergers and cartels, both developed- and developing-world
antitrust agencies have implemented these benchmarked norms into their
own laws and practices. 60
Generally, there is no similar international consensus on the solution to
the specific problem of public restraints. Moreover, existing substantive
standards for addressing public restraints vary from country to country.
Because of the variance in domestic substantive standards, which often
leave a significant regulatory gap in the remedy of anticompetitive public
restraints, the initial structure of any international response and its potential
substantive standard is critical. This also increases the difficulty of deter-
mining an appropriate substantive standard, given the disagreement about
what the most effective way to address antitrust public restraints is.
a. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
Over the years, the OECD has spent considerable resources studying
antitrust public restraints. At OECD Competition Law and Policy Commit-
tee meetings, agencies discuss the reports that OECD staff write for a given
issue and case studies that agencies submit on a topic. This sort of repeated
interaction among agencies is meant to identify commonalities in ap-
proaches and make personal and agency-level connections between regula-
tors across jurisdictions. Over time, OECD work products and meetings
create antitrust enforcement and conceptual norms that can be diffused at
the domestic level to fight public restraints. The OECD's strength is in its
ability to take stock of existing laws and regulations of countries and to
provide a synthesis of its findings for OECD members. This stocktaking has
had an impact on other organizations. For example, the ICN has relied on
OECD reports and other work product in a number of its documents.' 6
The OECD has, in recent years, examined antitrust immunities and
public restraints. For example, at the 2006 Global Forum on Competition,
agencies discussed a report on concessions (in which public restraints often
http://www'intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference-1st naples 2002/speech
gdz.pdf
160 Mariana Bode & Oliver Budzinski, Competing Ways Towards International Antitrust: The
WTO Versus the ICN 3 (Marburg Papers on Econ., Working Paper No. 03-2005, 2005).
161 See, e.g., ICN, REPORT OF THE ICN WORKING GROUP ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
(May 3, 2006), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference
5thcapetown 2006/Reportofthe TelecomsWorkingGroup.pdf; ICN, Co-operation Between Competi-
tion Agencies in Cartel Investigations (Int'l Competition Network Cartels Working Group, May 2006),
available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_5th-capetown_
2006/CompetitionAgencieslnCatellnvestigations.pdf; Biggar & Heimler, supra note 120.
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play a role). The report focuses on how antitrust regulation should address
competition issues in this area. The report includes both a report by the
OECD Secretariat and comments by eleven agencies.' Similarly, a 2009
report entitled "Competition Policy, Industrial Policy and National Cham-
pions" surveyed how countries address government preferences for national
champions that may affect competition.'63 Moreover, the work of a now-
disbanded OECD Joint Group on Trade and Competition focused on the
trade-related public restraints interface."
Specific to addressing public restraints, the weakness of the OECD is
twofold. First, the OECD has not created any recommended practices spe-
cific to public restraints. Rather, the OECD has focused its non-binding
resolutions on addressing enforcement issues that are based more on im-
proving coordination across agencies and those that focus on substantive
issues-hard-core cartels and merger control."65 In neither of these interna-
tional antitrust areas is the restraint at question generally a public restraint;
rather, both focus on restraints created by private parties. In merger control,
the primary conduct is the potential merger or acquisition of two private
parties. Likewise, in hard-core cartels the issue is a conspiracy to fix prices
by (mostly) private competitors across jurisdictions.
The second, and more serious problem, is that the OECD lacks an ef-
fective compliance mechanism to produce enforcement by its members.'66
The OECD Competition Law and Policy Committee requires sign-off by
OECD member governments on proposed best practices. Nevertheless,
many of these same governments are the very ones that have created immu-
nities within their antitrust laws. Moreover, norm creation on the part of the
OECD seems to be lethargic. It took nearly forty years-from the OECD
Competition Law and Policy Committee's inception in 1961 to 1998-
before agreement could be reached on a recommendation of best practices
162 OECD, Global Forum on Competition: Roundtable on Concessions, OECD Doc.
DAF/COMP/GF(2006)2 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/48/42170273.pdf.
163 OECD, Industrial Policy, Competition Policy, and National Champions, OECD Doc.
DAF/COMP/GF(2009)I/REVI (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2009doc.nsf/
ENGDATCORPLOOK/NT0000OA8A/$FILE/JT0325893 I.PDF.
164 See, e.g., OECD, Consistencies and Inconsistencies Between Trade and Competition Policies,
OECD Doc. COMITD/DAFFE/ CLP(98)25/FINAL (Feb. 25, 1999); OECD, Competition and Trade
Effects of Vertical Restraints, OECD Doc. COM/DAFFE/CLP/TD(99)54 (1999); OECD, Competition
and Trade Effects of Abuse of Dominance, OECD Doc. COM/DAFFE/CLP/TD(2000)2 1/FINAL (Aug.
4, 2000).
165 OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Car-
tels, OECD Doc. (98)35/FINAL (1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/4/2350130.pdf;
OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Merger Review, OECD Doe. C(2005)34 (2005), available at
http://webdominol .oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/c%282005%2934.
166 The OECD measures compliance via reports based on Council recommendations only, not of
various discussion papers. See, e.g., OECD, HARD CORE CARTELS: THIRD REPORT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1998 RECOMMENDATION 7-8 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/58/I/35863307.pdf.
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on hard-core cartels, even though international hard-core cartels had been
an enforcement priority, at least for the United States, since the pre-World
War II period.'67 This suggests that the OECD may be of limited effective-
ness in addressing the elimination of public restraints. Another problem
may be substantive. Disagreement remains as to how much public restraints
are a problem and on the different substantive approaches to combat them.
International power dynamics also affect the OECD's ability to com-
bat public restraints. OECD membership shapes OECD dynamics and ef-
fectiveness. OECD members are developed-world antitrust agencies. In
some cases, a number of developing-world agencies participate in OECD
meetings and work products. However, it is the developed world, and in
particular the United States and EU member states, that shape the agenda of
the OECD. These enforcers shape the agenda of the OECD without signifi-
cant non-governmental stakeholder participation. That is, non-government
users of antitrust regulation do not have meaningful participation in the
OECD, its work products, or its norm diffusion. This lack of participation
makes norm diffusion more difficult at the domestic level. 168
b. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCTAD is similar in structure and outputs to the OECD, but gener-
ally is less effective. UNCTAD's founding worldview helped to shape its
tone in how the organization viewed competition policy. During its early
period, UNCTAD championed a set of development policies known as the
New International Economic Order ("NIEO").' 69 The NIEO's purpose was
to redress the international economic system in order to redistribute power
and wealth from the developed world to the developing world. UNCTAD's
overall agenda replicates itself somewhat in the antitrust arena, where
UNCTAD serves as a voice for developing-world antitrust agencies, offer-
ing a more sympathetic voice to approaches not based on the dominant Chi-
cago/Harvard antitrust model.' 70
167 WYATTr WELLS, ANTITRUST AND THE FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR WORLD 27 (2002). How-
ever, the OECD does follow up on its recommendations by tracking the implementation across countries
of recommended practices.
168 Sokol, supra note 5, at 100-01. However, OECD recommendations, because they are based on
agreed norms, do create legitimacy and have an effect for changing domestic legislation.
169 JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE NORTH-SOUTH
DEBATE 3-4 (1977).
170 William H. Page, Areeda, Chicago, and Antitrust Injury: Economic Efficiency and Legal Proc-
ess, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 909, 910 (1996) (arguing that Chicago School thought is the baseline for
antitrust in the United States); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
EXECUTION 37-38 (2005) (calling the fusion of Chicago analytical approach with Harvard antitrust
concerns the "new Harvard" approach).
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Like the OECD, UNCTAD has addressed public restraints in a number
of its documents and conferences. For example, one of its current projects is
to better understand the relationship between antitrust agencies and sector
regulators. It has developed a paper on best practices that identifies how to
create increased cooperation between sector regulators and antitrust authori-
ties to better limit public and mixed restraints.' 7 ' In another work product,
UNCTAD analyzed antitrust immunities.172
UJNCTAD's effectiveness in combating public restraints seems lim-
ited. First, UJNCTAD work products seem not to lave significant policy
impact outside of the UNCTAD community. 173 A second limitation on
UNCTAD's effectiveness, like that of the OECD, involves issues of im-
plementation and enforcement, rather than policy design and prescriptions.
UNCTAD does little to follow up on its reports and peer reviews to meas-
ure and facilitate compliance with its recommendations.
The power asymmetries play out even more dramatically in the
UNCTAD context than they do in the OECD context. Because UTNCTAD is
a developing-world-focused agency, the norms that it seeks to create on
antitrust issues are limited by the countervailing power that developed-
world countries use to push norms, technical assistance, and conferences.
To the extent that UNCTAD norms are somehow different from developed-
world norms (those of the European Commission and its member states,
and the United States in particular), the lack of meaningful participation
from the EU and United States in UNCTAD reduces the likelihood of adop-
tion of UNCTAD norms by many UNCTAD members. 74 Additionally,
public restraints generally (though not necessarily specific to immunities)
are more likely to be found in developing-world countries, as these coun-
tries have liberalized their economies less than developed-world countries.
171 UNCTAD Trade and Development Board, Best Practices for Defining Respective Competen-
cies and Settling of Cases, Which Involve Joint Action by Competition Authorities and Regulatory Bod-
ies 9, TD/RBP/CONF.6/13/Rev. 1 (2006), available at http://www.unctad.ch/en/docs/tdrbpconf6dl 3revl
_en.pdf.
172 Khemani, supra note 14, at 11-13.
173 It might not be surprising that UNCTAD documents do not get referenced in OECD documents.
After all, there may be some institutional turf battles. The OECD may believe that since the most impor-
tant antitrust agencies are active OECD members, UNCTAD has little to teach OECD. More telling is
that not a single UNCTAD publication has been cited in ICN documents. Since the first step of the ICN
is to take stock of the existing literature in antitrust to better determine where consensus may be reached,
the omission of UNCTAD documents shows that UNCTAD has limited impact even in a forum that
represents both developing- and developed-world interests (and in which UNCTAD participates).
174 The United States voted against U.N. General Assembly 59/221 in 2005 which linked antitrust
to trade and development in which countries could set up antitrust systems "best suited to their devel-
opment needs." G. A. Res. 59/221 30, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/59/221 (Feb. 11, 2005), available
at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO4/489/52/PDF/NO448952.pdf?OpenElement UNCT-
AD does not have high level international participation from the United States and EU in contrast to
OECD and ICN meetings.
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c. International Competition Network
The ICN is a third international organization devoted to antitrust law.
However, in its form and function, the ICN is distinct from both the OECD
and UNCTAD. In at least two important ways, the ICN is stronger. First,
the ICN encourages non-governmental stakeholder participation. Empirical
work suggests that input in design by stakeholders leads to better perform-
ance outputs.'75 In the antitrust context, users of antitrust systems help to
shape the output of the ICN. These non-governmental stakeholders include
academics, the business sector (companies, their outside lawyers and
economists), and non-governmental organizations. Moreover, non-
governmental stakeholder participation includes both developed- and de-
veloping-world participants.
The use of non-state actors is a critical component to the ICN. This use
is part of a broader increase in the role and impact of non-state actors gen-
erally across different areas of law.'76 The participation of non-government
stakeholders removes the insulation that antitrust agencies would have if
they met only amongst themselves. The participation and interaction of
different stakeholders shields against insulation by agencies that might ig-
nore important information critical to achieving more effective results.'77
Through their participation, private actors shape the nature and structure of
their institutional environment.'7 8 Such participation provides for important
direct feedback loops to make corrections to policies.'79
The second distinguishing feature of the ICN, relative to other interna-
tional antitrust institutions, is that it is a virtual organization. This means
that the ICN lacks a permanent bureaucracy. The lack of bureaucracy in-
creases participation by agencies and non-government stakeholders since it
reduces opportunities for free-riding off of the work of others. Without the
support of all of these stakeholders, the ICN would cease to function. The
lack of a permanent bureaucracy limits the potential for a bureaucratic dys-
function based on insulation or universalism. A large bureaucracy can lead
175 R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984); Giles
Slinger, Spanning the Gap-The Theoretical Principles That Connect Stakeholder Policies to Business
Performance, 7 CORP. GOVERN. INT'L REV. 136, 138-39 (1999); Tom R. Tyler, Kenneth A. Rasinski &
Nancy Spodick, Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process
Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 79 (1985); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-
Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got To Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 817-26 (2001).
176 Thomas Risse, Transnational Actors and World Politics, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 261, 262 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2002).
177 Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International
Organizations, 53 INT'L ORG. 699, 722 (1999); JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING
INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 3-4 (1989).
178 Christine Oliver, Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 145,
153 (1991); BEN ROSAMOND, THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 114 (2000).
179 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 177, at 723.
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to insulation in decision-making from alternative approaches."' 0 Bureaucrats
may apply generalized knowledge inflexibly, even when particular circum-
stances may require a more contextual approach. 8' The advantage of the
virtual design of the ICN is that agencies can more easily take ownership of
the various work products and outputs. This ownership makes it more likely
that the ICN will be able to diffuse its norms to antitrust agencies and to
other users of antitrust law. The increased number of participants in the
ICN creates additional nodes for knowledge of the work products. This, in
turn, creates institutional memory and more contact points for norm diffu-
sion.
The ICN creates regulatory change through its various working
groups. The purpose of each working group is four-fold: identify a problem
for study; study the problem; present findings; and begin the process of
harmonization. 2 Through this process, as working groups build consensus
on issues, momentum builds for increased harmonization on antitrust law
and policy.'83 This is not to suggest that there is convergence on a single
standard. Rather, the approach identified for consensus positions allows for
leeway based on the specific country situation of each agency.
In a number of working groups, the ICN has moved from analysis and
norm creation to implementation. The steering group has pushed for early
success of issues that it can solve. These issues are ones where some con-
sensus can be established.8 4 This is a results-oriented agenda. The strength
of the ICN has been in fostering procedural and coordination convergence,
such as in mergers and cartels.'85 The ICN has achieved some substantive
results in those areas in which there is substantive agreement, such as car-
tels. In areas where there may be substantive disagreement, ICN findings
for best practices have not been tested and the descriptive language of best
practices is broad.
The working group most directly linked to the issue of public restraints
is the Competition Policy Implementation ("CPI") Working Group. The
CPI focuses its efforts on building institutional capacity among young anti-
trust agencies. 6 The ICN has centralized many of its learning tools online
180 MARY DOUGLAS, How INSTITUTIONS THINK24-25 (1986).
181 Barnett& Finnemore, supra note 177, at 721.
182 Sokol, supra note 5, at 109.
183 Merit E. Janow, Observations on Two Multilateral Venues: The International Competition
Network (ICN) and the WTO, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 2003, supra note 63, at 47.
184 Consensus requires unanimity of ICN members. Any ICN member can block a recommended
practice. Denmark held up one of the recommended merger practices based on concerns over the spe-
cific language, even in the face of EU and U.S. pressure to the contrary.
185 Oliver Budzinski, The International Competition Network: Prospects and Limits on the Road
Towards Competition Governance, 8 COMPETITION & CHANGE 223, 231 (2004); Sokol, supra note 5, at
106.
186 ICN, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group: Work Plan 2008-2009 (2008), avail-
able at http:l/www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mediallibrary/CP/CPI WG_2.pdf.
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to provide agencies easy reference to its materials for new antitrust agen-
cies. Although within the CPI there has been no discussion of direct immu-
nities as public restraints, public restraints discussion has arisen concerning
indirect immunities in a number of different documents relating to imple-
mentation and competition advocacy. The capacity-building area has criti-
cal importance to public restraints. As agencies build up their capacity in
enforcement and advocacy, they are better able to fight anticompetitive
public restraints.
Previous work by the ICN focused on competition advocacy. A com-
petition advocacy working group identified those elements of competition
advocacy that have been effective and created more robust competition
advocacy. Work focused in four areas: (1) Advocacy Information Center;
(2) Model Advocacy Provisions; (3) Sector Studies; and (4) Practical Tech-
niques.'87 Each of these subgroups provided input as to experiences from
successful competition advocacy. However, there are limitations to the im-
pact of this work. Recently, the ICN resurrected this working group. In do-
ing so it recognized the importance of competition advocacy to confront
public restraints.
In contrast to the merger and cartel working groups, the CPI group has
not yet created training sessions to increase domestic capacity for address-
ing public restraints. The ICN has yet to create a database of existing com-
petition policy submissions, which could serve as templates that younger
agencies may use to create their own policy. Such a database would reduce
the time and information costs of drafting such advocacy papers. Public
restraints-related work also lacks any follow-up from the ICN or private
parties to determine how effective the ICN work has been to date in im-
proving the capacity of agencies to fight public restraints. Private parties
have funded studies in merger best practices implementation, but such par-
ties have not responded with the same effort to address implementation of
recommended practices on public restraints.'88
Another previous working group, Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated
Sectors, provided a general overview of how competition agencies work
with sector agencies in the Interrelations between the Antitrust and Regula-
tory Authorities subgroup.'89 Addressing how competition policy relates to
187 ICN, Future Plans of the Advocacy Working Group (Advocacy Working Group, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conferenceIst naples-2002/
fiturejplans.pdf.
188 J. William Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, Implementation of the ICN's Recommended Merger
Practices: A Work-in-(Early)-Progress, ANTITRUST SOURCE, July 2005, available at http://www.abanet.
org/antitrust/at-source/05/07/JuO5-Rowley7=28f.pdf.
189 ICN, Competition Advocacy in Regulated Sectors: Examples of Success (Capacity Building &
Competition Policy Working Group, Apr. 2004), available at http://www.intemationalcompetition
network.org/media/library/conference 3rd seoul_2004/capacitybuild sg4_seoul.pdf.; ICN, Competition
Advocacy Review-C-ase Studies on Regulated Sectors (Competition Policy Implementation Working
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sector regulators has helped to lay out various effective ways for agencies
to address overlapping concerns for the creation of a more efficient and
competitive market. For example, case studies of the telecommunications
and banking industries laid out specific recommended practices for agen-
cies to adopt to limit anticompetitive restraints, including public re-
straints.190 Both reports provide a background of issues, a summary of cur-
rent legal and economic approaches, and a proposed set of methods to im-
prove the role and effectiveness of antitrust agencies in addressing issues of
indirect immunities through sector regulation. Because these best practices
are recent, what remains unknown is whether agencies actually follow ICN
best practices in regulated industries. No follow-up work has been done to
measure compliance and implementation of the recommended practices.
The weakness of the ICN specific to addressing antitrust public re-
straints is that it may not have United States and EU support. There has
been no discussion at the ICN of immunities (such as export cartels), inter-
national trade/market access issues, or antidumping. No ICN work dis-
cusses how to overcome immunities directly. Moreover, most public re-
straints come about as a result of legislative failure. Agencies may not be so
effective as to be able to police against existing public restraints, though
they may be able to better affect the imposition of new public restraints.
Thus, recommended practices can only go so far when it is not a market
malfunction or a problem of coordination that causes the problem of public
restraints. Rather, it seems to be the ability of governments to limit legisla-
tion that is both existing and proposed. Agencies can make progress in this
area. However, this progress may be slow.
2. Hard Law-The World Trade Organization
The WTO is the major international organization that reduces govern-
ment-created trade barriers among countries. Yet, there is a general reluc-
tance on the part of many academics and policy makers to create binding
international trade disciplines for antitrust law.' 9' The reluctance stems from
issues that this Article addresses, such as a concern over a watered-down
common standard, a trade analysis that is dissimilar to that of antitrust, and
a belief that soft law solutions might be more effective than hard law solu-
Group, 2005), available at http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference
4th bonn_2005/CompetitionAdvocacyReview.pdf.
190 See, e.g., ICN, REPORT OF THE ICN WORKING GROUP ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
(May 3, 2006), available at http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_
5th_capetown_2006/ReportoftheTelecomsWorkingGroup.pdf; Biggar & Heimler, supra note 120.
191 See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of International Coop-
eration, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173, 175-76 (2005); John 0. McGinnis, The Political Economy of
International Antitrust Harmonization, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 549, 551-52 (2003).
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tions. These reservations do not, however, focus on antitrust public re-
straints that come in the form of direct or indirect antitrust immunities.'92
The purpose of the WTO is to serve as a pre-commitment mechanism.
This pre-commitment function allows domestic governments to be con-
strained by international commitments, the better to counter domestic rent-
seeking interest groups.'93 This pre-commitment mechanism reduces the
opportunism that results from a global prisoner's dilemma.'94 The WTO
enables each country to make commitments with the knowledge that all
other countries will be bound by the same commitments. Countries can also
retaliate against actions by trading partners that harm a previously negoti-
ated deal.'95
To overcome the time-inconsistency problem (where government fails
in its ability, to commit to future policies), countries may wish to bind them-
selves to an international commitment to uphold regulatory commitments.196
A binding international commitment locks in a domestic policy that might
otherwise not survive a current government.'97 To create such binding
commitments, hard law uses delegation of authority from a country to a
third party. A second element to hard law is that it has less ambiguity than
soft law for the conduct required to abide by commitments made. 9 ' Hard
law enforces domestic compliance for countries through binding interna-
tional adjudication. As such, hard law requires a level of centralized deci-
sion-making. Benefits from this centralization of binding international law
include the creation of "increased consistency between local rules, inter-
nalization of externalities, [and] the creation of positive network effects due
192 To be sure, earlier efforts to use the WTO for antitrust problems covered public restraints gen-
erally. See, e.g., Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement (Int'l
Antitrust Code Working Group Proposed Draft, 1993), 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628
(Aug. 19, 1993) (Special Supp.).
193 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade Policy as a Constitutional Problem: On Domestic Policy
Functions of International Rules, 41 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 405 passim (1996).
194 The prisoner's dilemma is a stock game theory problem. See MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME THEORY
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CONCEPTS AND SOLUTIONS 254 (1982).
195 KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
54-55 (2002).
196 Joseph Stiglitz, The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions, 12 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3, 8-11 (1998). Some take a public choice view of this type of failure by the government. See,
e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 35 (1991); Daron Acemoglu & James A.
Robinson, Inefficient Redistribution, 95 AM. POL. So. REv. 649, 649 (2001).
197 Lock-in may force countries to develop higher standards. Merit E. Janow, supra note 183, at
59; Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar
Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 217-18 (2000).
198 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT'L ORG. 421,427-28 (2000).
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to the use of common standards of interactions." '199 The enforcement of hard
law rules allows for easier consistency than the soft law alternative because
of the binding nature of hard law.
The WTO agreements bind countries the way other commitments (or
contracts) do.2"' Members limit their sovereignty to take advantage of the
benefits of trade liberalization. A reduction in some domestic discretion to
pursue parochial interests is part of the bargain to gain access to these trade
benefits. The loss of sovereignty becomes part of a country's cost-benefit
analysis. A country will give up some sovereignty if the benefits (such as
increased trade and economic development) outweigh the costs.
International coordination at the WTO level may reduce costs of inter-
national problems. Increased cooperation allows for countries to create
remedies jointly that will minimize the risk of inconsistent obligations. The
strength of the WTO is that it may solve system-wide problems, because its
rules can take into account interdependencies and externality effects in de-
signing a common set of rules.20 ' International cooperation is necessary
because domestic interests often neglect foreign consumers and their inter-
ests.2 °2 The WTO may be the best way to protect these foreign interests.
Self restraint via binding international mechanisms protects govern-
ments from themselves.° 3As the previous section on domestic institutional
alternatives revealed, because domestic legislatures, sector regulators, and
courts embed public restraints, overcoming such immunities domestically is
difficult. The price of overcoming binding international commitments
comes at significant reputational cost, because non-compliance makes other
countries less likely to sign future agreements with a non-compliant coun-
try. Lock-in through binding international commitments provides political
cover for agencies to foster procompetitive change, as governments can
blame international commitments for change that would be unpopular do-
mestically.0 4
199 Eric Brousseau & Emmanuel Raynaud, The Economics of Private Institutions: An Introduction
to the Dynamics of Institutional Frameworks and to the Analysis of Multilevel Multi-Type Governance
29 (July 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=920225.
200 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DSI /AB/R, WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 24, 1996) ("The WTO Agreement is a treaty-the international
equivalent of a contract."); Robert E. Hudec, Private Anticompetitive Behavior in World Markets: A
WTO Perspective, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 1045, 1049 (2003). But see Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of
International Agreements, 16 EURO. J. INT'L L. 579, 583-85 (2005) (arguing that binding WTO com-
mitments are different from contractual commitments).
201 This observation comes from an application of firm level behavior. See Bengt Holmstrom, The
Firm as Subeconomy, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 75-76 (1999).
202 McGinnis, supra note 191, at 569.
203 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS passim (2008) (discussing pre-commitment generally).
204 It is easier to ensure compliance when violations require administrative rather than legislative
change. Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings:
The Record to Date, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 397, 399 (2007).
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The fundamental problem that the WTO solves, as theoretical models
explain, is insufficient market access.25 The WTO combats market access
public restraints through non-discrimination. Non-discrimination requires
that foreign firms be treated the same as domestic firms, and without dis-
crimination from other trading partners as well. 216 WTO commitments so-
lidify a domestic policy in favor of non-discrimination by increasing the
costs of non-compliance. 27 Non-discrimination reduces opportunities for
the erection of market access barriers and for countries to undertake a na-
tionalist-driven trade policy. 28
The WTO by its nature does not address private restraints by business.
Rather, there must be some degree of government involvement in the dis-
criminatory restraint for WTO jurisdiction to attach. 2 9 By definition, the
WTO therefore addresses public restraints of trade. WTO provisions are
vague, however, so adjudication plays a significant role in determining the
meaning of the text. This makes WTO adjudicators the primary institutional
movers in the WTO I°
Non-discrimination helps check domestic public choice impulses. It al-
lows for foreign exporters to have more effective participation in domestic
regulation that affects their competitiveness. 21' Foreign exporters tend to be
under-represented in domestic legislation. 212 Since exclusion of foreign in-
terests has aggregate effects on market competition and dynamic growth,
international hard law commitments assist foreign firms to achieve equal
regulatory footing with domestic firms.
The WTO has limitations in its ability to address public restraints. It
can discipline discriminatory measures. However, if a measure applies the
same way to domestic and foreign actors, there is no discrimination. Thus,
205 Jose E. Alvarez et al., It's a Question of Market Access, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 60 (2002);
BAGWELL& STAIGER, supra note 195, at 125-27.
206 Without companies on an equal footing, it is difficult for markets to function to allow for the
benefits of competition to pass on to consumers. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregula-
tion and Managed Competition in Network Industries, 15 YALE J. REG. 117, 127 (1998).
207 Edward T. Swaine, Against Principled Antitrust, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 959, 968 (2003).
208 Mariana Bode & Oliver Budzinski, An Antitrust Primer for Federal Law Enforcement Person-
nel; Competing Ways Towards International Antitrust: The WTO Versus the ICN, in ANTITRUST POLICY
ISSUES 85 (Patrick Moriati ed., 2006).
209 Rex J. Zedalis, When do the Activities of Private Parties Trigger WTO Rules?, 10 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 335, 335-37 (2007).
210 Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates?
Who Decides?, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 459, 470 (2004).
211 Miguel Poiares Maduro, Europe and the Constitution: What if This is as Good as it Gets?, in
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE 74, 85 (J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds.,
2003); McGinnis, supra note 191, at 552.
212 Maduro, supra note 211, at 93 ("Most instances of discrimination against (or underrepresenta-
tion of) foreign nationals in national political processes are, at the same time, instances of capture of the
national political process by a national interest group against the interests of a dormant national major-
ity.").
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this is not an area in which the policy of non-discrimination will have an
effect. The WTO cannot ban inefficient government measures that apply
equally to domestic and foreign firms. Diagram B explains these potential
overlaps:
DIAGRAM B. INTERSECTION OF ANTITRUST AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
Disc minatory Aniom.itv
In Diagram B above, the WTO can address only the shaded behavior
that is both anticompetitive and that discriminates between foreign and do-
mestic actors. As this diagram illustrates, non-discrimination does not pre-
clude anticompetitive behavior from antitrust. Rather, to avoid sanction, the
regulation must apply equally to domestic and foreign actors." 3 This allows
countries to maintain policy choices (such as immunities) at the domestic
level-so long as the immunities impact both domestic and foreign firms.
Nevertheless, non-discrimination removes some anticompetitive antitrust
immunities. And its more active use could reduce the ability of countries to
discriminatorily apply their antitrust laws to create national champions.
Non-discrimination could be fairly broad if de facto discrimination is in-
cluded. A regulation that appears to treat foreign and domestic companies
equally could have a disparate impact on foreigners.
213 WTO, Core Principles, Including Transparency, Non-Discrimination and Procedural Fairness:
Background Note by the Secretariat 2-5, WT/WGTCP/W/209 (Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition Policy, Sept. 19, 2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/
directdoc.Asp?DDFDocuments/t/WT/WGTCP/W209.doc.
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WTO jurisdiction attaches even when there may be domestic institu-
tional responses to solve these problems. In some cases, the WTO response
may be less effective than the domestic one and would allow global regula-
tors to second guess domestic regulations. Additionally, there are limits to
the WTO's adjudicatory capacity to address issues in which there may be
an overlap between discriminatory and anticompetitive measures, as the
subsequent case study on Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat
and Treatment of Imported Grain ("Canada Wheat")"4 will illustrate.
The WTO has some capacity to address externality-creating public re-
straints. For example, under the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Meas-
ures Agreement, WTO commitments limit export subsidies to those coun-
tries that specify on their list of commitments." 5 WTO rulings against both
the U.S. and the EU in subsidies cases demonstrate that these commitments
apply even to the most powerful members of the WTO.216 Whereas domes-
tic institutions lack the incentives to tackle externalities-causing problems,
the WTO has the incentive to reduce trade-distorting externalities at the
country level more effectively than soft law because government-to-
government level negotiations reduce trade-distorting effects." 7
There are limitations to the WTO's ability to address public re-
straints." 8 An implicit assumption against inclusion of a role in antitrust
regulation for the WTO is that somehow antitrust is "pure," and based on
214 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of
Imported Grain, WT/DS276/R (Apr. 6, 2004); WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Relat-
ing to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, AB-2004-3 (2004).
215 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1(A), Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1154 (1994).
216 Appellate Body Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, AB-2004-5 (2004); Ap-
pellate Body Report, European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar, AB-2005-2 (2005).
217 A WTO solution on spillovers is somewhat analogous to antitrust scholarship on the impact of
the U.S. state action exemption. Inman and Rubinfeld suggest a two-part approach to address the spill-
over problem in state action jurisprudence that can be applied internationally as a way to determine the
feasibility of international intervention for public restraints. First, a court would decide the economic
impact of an anticompetitive spillover. Second, the court would examine if the interests of foreign
consumers were included in the deliberation of the state act. If both inquiries are affirmed then the state
regulation fails their monopoly spillover test. If so, a review of the regulation is appropriate. Robert P.
Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political
Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1276 (1997).
Those U.S. practitioners and policymakers that oppose a role for international binding commitments in
antitrust may not import the thinking of their own experience of domestic public restraints that cause
negative externalities.
218 This is not the first article to address the WTO's capacity to address public restraints. Much of
the discussion on the WTO in an antitrust context addresses public restraints. However, little of this
academic and policy discussion focuses on antitrust immunities and no previous work utilizes compara-
tive institutional analysis to enrich this discussion. Indeed, as the capacities of the WTO have shifted
vis-a-vis other institutional alternatives since WTO discussions began on competition policy in 1996, the
desirability of the role of the WTO requires a comparative institutional analysis.
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efficiency concerns, and trade is "impure," as trade concessions are the
result of trade-offs among producer interests. '9 However, antitrust regula-
tion domestically is also a result of trade-offs as to what sort of policies
may be undertaken (and what may be immune) and the scope of prosecuto-
rial discretion that an agency may have.2 '
III. INSTITUTIONAL FAILINGS IN COMPETITION POLICY
A. WTO Adjudication: A Case Study
Nearly sixty provisions within the WTO address various competition
issues.2 Some of this regulation of competition is implicit in the text.2 22
Yet, explicit provisions for antitrust regulation may be unnecessary because
of implicit existing coverage in WTO commitments on goods, services, and
other provisions.2 2 3 A critical question is how effective has the WTO been
in addressing an antitrust-style analysis and in melding trade rules with
antitrust concepts based on industrial organization economics. In some
situations, a WTO policy of non-discrimination may solve antitrust prob-
lems.2 24 However, as Diagram B above illustrates, there may be cases in
which a market access issue is not a function of anticompetitive conduct
(i.e., not an antitrust issue). The ability of the WTO to distinguish between
such situations tests the feasibility of the WTO to remedy potential an-
ticompetitive public restraints that implicate antitrust-specific issues.
Results of recent WTO case law are not promising. Thus far, there
have been few WTO dispute settlement adjudications that address antitrust
regulation directly or indirectly. 215 The WTO dispute system, as currently
219 Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L L.
478,489-94 (2000).
220 Fred S. McChesney, Economics Versus Politics in Antitrust, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 133
(1999).
221 Jose E. Alvarez & John H. Jackson, Afterword: The Linkage Problem-Comments on Five
Texts, 96 AM. J. INT'L L., 118, 124 (1996).
222 Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, WTO Core Principles and Trade/Competition Roundtable, in
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 2003, supra note 63, at 669; Alvarez & Jackson, supra
note 221, at 124 ("In short, as to competition policy being dealt with by the WTO Agreements, there is
already a substantial position for the WTO (those who resist are too late!).").
223 It is quite possible that similar types of arguments could be made about other specialized areas
of law that the WTO implicates such as tax or investments. An analysis of the appropriate institution to
address those and other specialized areas is beyond the scope of this article.
224 BAGWELL & STAIGER, supra note 195, at 162.
225 See, e.g., Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper,
WT/DSAA/R (Mar. 31, 1998); Panel Report, Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Serv-
ices, WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004); Appellate Body Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,
WT/DS136/AB/R & WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000); Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures
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conceived, has serious shortcomings with regard to its ability to handle
competition and competition-related cases. And preliminary results indicate
that the WTO may lack the competency to handle economically sophisti-
cated cases that are fact-intensive.
To illustrate the current capacity of WTO adjudication in this area, this
Article examines one relatively recent case, Canada Wheat, as a case study
with which to draw broader conclusions about the current form of WTO
adjudication. It illustrates that WTO jurisprudence is formalistic and lacks
the economic sophistication of antitrust decisions by generalized courts in
more developed antitrust jurisdictions.226
Agriculture is a sector of the economy particularly prone to govern-
ment distortions. How these distortions affect competition is a difficult
question, given the various public restraints that combine with potential
private restraints. In Canada Wheat, the U.S. alleged that the Canada Wheat
Board ("CWB") used its legal and regulatory structure to engage in busi-
ness conduct that distorted markets in Canada and abroad.2 7 Upon appeal,
the more limited competition-related claim was that the CWB used its an-
ticompetitive advantages in third country markets to engage in predatory
pricing.228 The U.S. alleged that the CWB could undertake such action,
which would be unprofitable for ordinary businesses, because it was a State
Trading Enterprise ("STE").
As an STE, the CWB enjoyed certain government privileges that pri-
vate firms lacked, which, in turn, affected the overall market and the inter-
national competitiveness of domestic firms. Though the United States
couched many of its claims about the CWB within a competition frame-
work, it did not undertake a detailed, fact-intensive inquiry of the effects of
the CWB within an antitrust context. Put differently, the United States did
not present evidence sufficient to satisfy an antitrust claim. An antitrust
analysis in the case could have been used to prove or disprove larger ques-
tions of "competitive" distortions.
Under WTO jurisprudence, STEs have very few constraints on their
behavior. An STE, under GATT Article XVII:1(a), must act in a non-
discriminatory manner and, under GATT Article XVII:1(b), must operate
Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/R, AB-2004-3 (Aug. 30,
2004).
226 See J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Uberregulation Without Economics: The World Trade
Organization's Decision in the U.S.-Mexico Arbitration on Telecommunications Services, 57 FED.
COMM. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2004); Damien J. Neven & Petros C. Mavroidis, El Mess in TELMEX: A Comment
on Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 271, 272 (2006).
227 Panel Reports, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported
Grain, 16.12-.28, WT/DS276/R (Apr. 6, 2004).
228 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of
Imported Grain, 39, WT/DS276/R, AB-2004-3 (Aug. 30, 2004) (The U.S. claimed "that the CWB's
legal structure and mandate, together with the privileges enjoyed by the CWB, create[d] an incentive for
the CWB to make sales which are not solely in accordance with commercial considerations.").
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using commercial considerations.229 Canada Wheat illustrates the limits of
the current WTO treatment of competition issues. The case offers an exam-
ple of the current gap in WTO thinking and supports a claim that current
WTO rules do not pose a credible constraint on the operations of STEs.23
In Canada Wheat, the U.S. claimed that (1) the CWB export regime
was inconsistent with obligations under GATT Article XVII: 1; and (2) cer-
tain measures relating to Canada's bulk grain handling system and to the
transportation of grain by rail in Canada were inconsistent with Canada's
obligations under GATT Article 111:421 1 and Article 2 of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures.232 On appeal, the case addressed only
the Article XVII: 1 complaint.
In its Article XVII: 1 complaint, the U.S. enumerated the advantages
that the CWB enjoyed because of its state ownership. These preferences
included
the CWB's monopoly right to purchase Western Canadian grain for domestic human con-
sumption and export, the approval and guarantees of initial payments to farmers by the Ca-
nadian government, and the reimbursement by the Canadian Parliament of losses sustained
by the CWB . . . [and] the Canadian government's guarantee of all CWB borrowings. This
guarantee allows the CWB to borrow at more favourable rates and then loan funds at a higher
rate, thereby generating interest income. This additional revenue ... is a key element of the
CWB's legal framework that gives the CWB increased pricing flexibility and, in turn, creates
incentives to make sales in a non-commercial manner.233
These are all preferences that private companies competing against the
CWB lack. The U.S. argued that the use of government-created privileges
for the CWB itself meant that the CWB did not operate under commercial
considerations. According to the U.S., these preferences suggested that
there were no disciplines against government behavior. Competing against
the government is not the same as competing against private firms because
229 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XVII:l(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 1l, 55 U.N.
T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
230 MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
347-48 (3d ed. 2005).
231 GATT art. 11I 4 (requiring that imported products "shall be accorded treatment no less favour-
able than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and require-
ments affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use").
232 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter TRIMs]. Under
Article II of TRIMs (national treatment), the United States relied upon language in Paragraph 1 (a) of the
Annex to the TRIMs Agreement. The national treatment obligations include domestic law or administra-
tive rulings that provide advantages to domestic firms through "the purchase or use by an enterprise of
products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular prod-
ucts, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local
production." TRIMs, supra, at Annex I(a).
233 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of
Imported Grain, 38, WT/DS276/R, AB-2004-3 (Aug. 30, 2004).
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of the special privileges provided that might allow a firm to artificially
lower its cost of doing business or to focus on revenue maximization over
profit maximization.234
The Appellate Body ruled in favor of the CWB. More importantly, and
critical to understanding the limitations of the WTO in addressing competi-
tion issues, the Appellate Body explicitly rejected an antitrust law analysis
as inappropriate to a discussion of STE behavior and what might be meant
by STE "commercial considerations. '235 It reasoned that a potential viola-
tion under Article XVII: 1 must be assessed by means of a market-based
analysis based on "commercial considerations." The Appellate Body then
suggested that if the CWB used the privileges and advantages that it en-
joyed, this did not disadvantage private enterprises.236 If the privileges in
question in fact provided the CWB with advantages that a private firm
lacked based on various implicit subsidies and state aid, the Appellate Body
analysis did not take into account that the STE privileges may have signifi-
cantly distorted the market.
The Appellate Body reasoned that limitations inherent in Article
XVII: 1 allowed for some distortions. Under the Appellate Body's reason-
ing, these distortions would seem to include the ability to price discriminate
for anticompetitive purposes.237 It would also include price discrimination
for the purpose of predatory pricing. 38 The U.S. framed the case as one of
raising rivals' costs or predation based on the effect of the various privi-
leges that the CWB received.23 The U.S. claimed a firm that operates under
commercial considerations must "sell at prices that, at a minimum, would
equal the replacement value of a good.""24 This is shorthand for the need of
a commercial firm to cover its marginal costs. However, the panel did not
234 David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public
Enterprises, 22 REV. INDUS. ORG. 183, 183-84 (2003).
235 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of
Imported Grain, 7 145, WT/DS276/R, AB-2004-3 (Aug. 30, 2004).
236 Id. 7 148-49.
237 Id. IT 96-97.
238 Id. 28-29.
239 However, the record did not contain data suggesting which firms had their costs raised on the
global wheat export market nor which firms had suffered from claims of "predation." On predatory
pricing, see Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697, 697 (1975); Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts
To Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory-and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power
112 YALE L.J. 681, 711-14 (2003); Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 1 (2005); Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective,
62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 585 (1994); Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 11I YALE
L.J. 941, 941 (2002). On raising rivals costs, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticom-
petitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 230 (1986);
Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267, 267 (1983).
240 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of
Imported Grain, 29, WT/DS276/R , AB-2004-3 (Aug. 30, 2004).
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provide an economics-based approach to support such an analysis. This
lack of analysis in the trade context contrasts with the antitrust analysis of
such claims.
At no point in either the panel or Appellate Body decisions was there a
discussion of the relevant market, a basic inquiry in antitrust law. Increas-
ingly, scholars suggest that quantity and product homogeneity are not ap-
propriate measures for certain commodity markets.24" ' This includes wheat
markets, where there are three potentially distinct world markets for wheat:
durum; high quality wheat; and low-grade, animal feed-quality wheat.242 In
Canada Wheat, there was no discussion of an in-depth analysis of geo-
graphic markets and product markets for each type of grain. It may be that
"global" markets are not so global because of transportation costs or tariff
barriers.243
Once the market has been defined, then a competition analysis would
examine whether a business has market power and has abused such power.
As one leading agricultural economist notes, "[t]ypically, where market
power is believed to exist in commodity markets, state trading institutions
or other trade interventions exist and are required for that power to be exer-
cised."2" It is helpful to distinguish between two meanings of market
power-antitrust market power and non-antitrust market power (although
economists tend to use the two meanings interchangeably, this leads to
some confusion).24 In the first meaning, market power is antitrust market
power. In antitrust market power, there is an ability to maintain price above
the competitive level or to exclude competitors from the market. In non-
antitrust market power, a firm can set prices above marginal cost. However,
it cannot sustain this above the competitive price. For example, a store that
has market power but lacks antitrust market power and charges too high a
price for coffee will find that consumers will flock to other nearby coffee
shops or substitute other products for coffee. Carlton and Perloff describe
antitrust market power as "monopoly power" and draw the distinction as
follows: "Prices may exceed marginal cost even though profits are not
above competitive levels. For example, if there are large enough fixed
241 Colin A. Carter & Donald MacLaren, Price or Quantity Competition? Oligopolistic Structures
in International Commodity Markets, 5 REv. INT'L EcON. 373, 373-74 (1997); Troy G. Schmitz &
Richard Gray, State Trading Enterprises and Revenue Gains from Market Power: The Case of Barley
Marketing and the Canadian Wheat Board, 25 J. AGRIC. RESOURCE ECON. 596, 610 (2000).
242 W.H. Furtan, D.F. Kraft & EW. Tyrchniewicz, Can the Canadian Wheat Board Extract Mo-
nopoly Rents? The Case of the Spring Wheat Market, 6 INT'L J. ECON. BuS. 417, 417-18 (1999).
243 See Richard J. Sexton & Mingxia Zhang, An Assessment of the Impact of Food Industry Market
Power on U.S. Consumers, 17 AGRIBUSINESS 59, 59-60 (2001) (examining the impact on consumers in
the U.S. caused by market power at the manufacturer or retailer stage of the food production chain).
244 Philip C. Abbott, Competition Policy and Agricultural Trade 6-7 (OECD Workshop on Emerg-
ing Trade Issues in Agriculture, COM/AGR/CArD/TC/WS(98) 106, 1998).
245 DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 92 (3d
ed. 2000).
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costs, profits may be zero even if price exceeds marginal cost. 24 6 One could
usefully distinguish the two terms by using "monopoly power" to describe a
market in which price exceeds marginal cost and profits are above competi-
tive levels, and using "market power" for markets in which price exceeds
marginal costs, but profits are not above competitive levels. Academics and
policy makers who make claims against STEs generally, and the CWB spe-
cifically, often discuss "market power." '247 Using the Carlton and Perloff
terminology, these claims are of market power rather than monopoly power.
It is possible that with global markets and differentiated products, the ex-
clusion of STEs from antitrust may allow STEs to limit output and/or raise
prices because of their monopoly power. If antitrust law could reach this
behavior, however, it would limit the ability of STEs to exercise monopoly
power.
The STE status of the CWB should have played into the competition
analysis in Canada Wheat. There are two types of STEs-import and ex-
port STEs. The CWB is both an import and export STE. Export STEs only
have an anticompetitive spillover effect when they are large enough to pos-
sess international monopoly power for a particular good. Thus, only large
exporting countries potentially may have monopoly power. Small country
export STEs lack such monopoly power. Wheat is one such product, over
which large-country STEs may have monopoly power globally in the export
market.248 The structure of STEs also impacts their ability to exercise mar-
ket power internationally. International agriculture markets tend to be im-
perfect competition/oligopolistic markets because of high levels of concen-
tration among sellers.249 Because many international food markets are oli-
gopolistic in structure, opportunities exist for firms to capture rents from
these markets.25 °
The problem with the CWB case is that the United States did not offer,
nor did the case record show, any evidence of CWB export monopoly
power supporting an exclusion claim. There was no indication that globally
consumers were hurt from the CWB's pricing decisions. Indeed, quite the
opposite: consumers benefited from lower prices for wheat. There was no
support to the claim that the CWB somehow engaged in predation. Why
would the CWB want to engage in such predation? If because of its STE
status (and its immunity from antitrust) it sought revenue maximization
246 id.
247 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of
Imported Grain, 71, 147 WT/DS276/R, AB-2004-3 (Aug. 30, 2004).
248 Daniel H. Pick & Timothy A. Park, The Competitive Structure of U.S. Agricultural Exports, 73
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 133, 133 (1991).
249 Jeffrey J. Reimer & Kyle Stiegert, Imperfect Competition and Strategic Trade Theory: Evi-
dence for International Food and Agricultural Markets, 4 J. AGRIC. & FOOD INDUS. ORG. 1, 6-7 (2006)
(providing a literature review of previous studies).
250 Stephen F. Hamilton & Kyle W. Stiegert, An Empirical Test of the Rent-Shifting Hypothesis:
The Case of State Trading Enterprises, 58 J. INT'L ECON. 135, 155 (2002).
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rather than profit maximization (which is why private firms are in busi-
ness), the CWB could have driven competitors out of business with preda-
tory prices without the need for recoupment. If, however, the STE benefited
from not having to recoup profits because the Canadian government implic-
itly subsidized it, a traditional antitrust analysis of predation based on pri-
vate business behavior might not catch such behavior, since it would as-
sume that private actors would undertake behavior only if it was possible to
recoup the below-cost pricing."' 1
An import STE can impact international trade through market access
barriers, no matter what the size of the country, because it can limit access
to that particular country's market. For an import STE to have an anticom-
petitive effect, it must have a number of attributes. The STE must be able to
set up barriers to entry and exit. There must be no close product substitutes.
The STE must be granted certain exclusive rights and be exempted from
antitrust regulation. Because of the antitrust exemption, an import STE may
be granted privileges that confer monopoly power to it. For example, an
import STE may be the only seller of a product within a domestic market,
giving it monopoly power with regard to price. If an STE is both a state-
owned enterprise and a monopolist, it may be able to use a strategy of pre-
dation to keep out foreign entrants. 2 The STE may also be able to boycott
distributors who might otherwise deal with foreign producers who seek
access to the market. In a global context, an STE may have enough buyer
power to call the shots in the world market for certain goods. However, in
Canada Wheat, such a claim seems farfetched. To successfully undertake
predation, there first needs to be proof that an entity such as the CWB has
monopoly power. The WTO Appellate Body decision did not address this
issue.
The U.S. claim (never proved in the Canada Wheat case) was that the
CWB could cross-subsidize from the import-to-export markets.2"3 A review
of the academic literature on the CWB exports allows for a review of the
validity of the predation claim. Any commercial actor may price discrimi-
251 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) ("[l~t is
the means by which a predator profits from predation."); Sokol, Comparative Corporate Governance,
supra note 17.
252 David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Are Public Enterprises the Only Credible Preda-
tors?, 67 U. Ct|. L. REv. 271, 271 (2000); David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition
Law for State-Owned Enterprises, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 479,479-80 (2003).
253 Colin A. Carter, R.M.A. Loyns & Derek Berwald, Domestic Costs of Statutory Marketing
Authorities: The Case of the Canadian Wheat Board, 80 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 313, 323 (1998) (arguing
that the CWB regime may come with domestic costs, even to producers, as the CWB may be inefficient
in its goal); Julian M. Alston et al., Third-Country Effects and Second-Best Grain Trade Policies: Ex-
port Subsidies and Bilateral Liberalization, 79 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1300, 1300 (1997) (suggesting that
both the U.S. and Canada would benefit from the elimination of trade distorting policies).
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nate across markets based on what those markets are willing to bear.254 The
evidence before the WTO did not suggest otherwise. The CWB did price
discriminate.255 The CWB achieved price discrimination through a policy of
increasing sales to price-inelastic markets and decreasing sales to elastic
markets. 256 An ability to undertake price discrimination is not unique to
STEs such as the CWB. Private firms can and do price discriminate. In
many cases, price discrimination may have procompetitive effects, such as
increased efficiency.257
A number of jurisdictions use price-cost tests to measure predation,
such as average variable cost as a proxy for marginal cost, average avoid-
able cost, average total cost, or long run average incremental cost. Each test
has its advantages and disadvantages. None of these tests adequately ac-
count for the unique situation of state owned enterprises, or "SOEs," of
which STEs are a subset, because in practice these tests assume that costs
are not distorted by government privileges or soft budget constraints.
A number of jurisdictions use a recoupment test to determine whether
or not there was predation. There was no such discussion in the panel or
Appellate Body decisions as to the appropriate test (or indeed any test) to
determine how to measure if the CWB operated under commercial consid-
erations. Had such an analysis been undertaken, the panel would have con-
fronted unique issues presented by SOE anticompetitive conduct. That is, a
firm that does not act commercially has the ability to undertake strategies
like predatory pricing or raising rivals' costs, in which it can "use its special
privileges to gain market share through long-run price under-cutting. 258
Commercial actors are ones that are interested in financial return in which
market forces and cost constraints limit their ability to act.259 When actors
254 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 721(e) (1995).
255 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of
Imported Grain, 121, WT/DS276/R, AB-2004-3 (Aug. 30, 2004).
256 Harvey Brooks & Troy G. Schmitz, Price Discrimination in the International Grain Trade: The
Case of Canadian Wheat Board Feed Barley Exports, 15 AGRIBUSINESS 313,314 (1999). But see Colin
A. Carter & R.M.A. Lyons, The Canadian Wheat Board: Its Role in North American State Trading
(Institute of Int'l Studies Working Paper, 1998), available at http://aic.ucdavis.edu/oa/stecwb.pdf (argu-
ing that the CWB does not pursue a policy of strategic trade behavior via price discrimination).
257 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887-89 (2007) ("[E]conomics
literature is replete with procompetitive justifications for a manufacturer's use of resale price mainte-
nance."). See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, REGULATION MISLED BY MISREAD THEORY: PERFECT
COMPETITION AND COMPETITION-IMPOSED PRICE DISCRIMINATION 2 (2006); ABA SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION 76 (2006) ("[T]he
bulk of the economic literature on [resale price maintenance] .. .suggests that [it] is more likely to be
used to enhance efficiency than for anticompetitive purposes."); HERBERT HOvENKAMP, THE
ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 184-91 (2005).
258 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of
Imported Grain, 29, WT/DS276/R, AB-2004-3 (Aug. 30, 2004).
259 Id. 138.
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do not face these constraints, they are not commercial in nature (such as
many SOEs).
The CWB domestic policies involve rent transfers among farmers with
a system that provides income stability. It is necessary to have continuity of
participation in the CWB, or the system is ruined. Thus, there is a quid pro
quo inherent in the price pooling system. Where consumers benefit from
lower prices in export markets, there is no antitrust problem for consumers
in the export markets. Instead, the only consumers that lose out are those in
the Canadian domestic market, who are taxed to pay for the implicit export
subsidies and who pay higher prices domestically for cartelized wheat.
Because the antitrust exemption permits the CWB to cartelize, the
CWB can price pool.26° The practice of price pooling minimizes the price
and income risk to producers. This allows the CWB to have greater flexibil-
ity than private exporters when pricing products in the world market.26' A
private firm such as Cargill could buy and have deferred payments and
price pool. The difference is that a private firm cannot pursue this strategy
as effectively as the CWB because of the implicit preferences that the Ca-
nadian government gives to the CWB.
Even if the United States had been able to show proof of antitrust an-
ticompetitive harm, however, the WTO adjudicators seemed unable to un-
derstand the economics concepts as to the potential differing incentives of
SOEs relative to private firms. The panel had stated that "the CWB might,
due to the privileges it enjoys, sell wheat at lower prices than 'commercial
actors' could offer." '262 Nevertheless, in its review of the case the Appellate
Body did not believe that such selling at distorted costs constituted non-
commercial sales.263 This recognition suggests that even if the CWB was
successful in raising rivals' costs, this would not qualify as "non-
commercial sales" (i.e., sales that would violate the applicable GATT arti-
cles). But if the CWB were no different from a private firm like Cargill, it
would not be able to sustain such pricing because it would need to recoup
its below-marginal cost losses. Theoretically, this claim about predation
260 Jana Hranaiova, Harry de Gorter & Merlinda Ingco, Perspectives on Agricultural Export State
Trading Enterprises in the WTO Trade Negotiations (Agriculture and Rural Dev. Working Paper No.
31925, 2002), available at http://www.ppl.nl/bibliographies/wto/files/3104.pdf (analyzing the effects of
an export subsidy due to price pooling); Steve McCorriston & Donald MacLaren, State Trading, the
WTO and GA TTArticle XVII, 25 WORLD ECON. 107, 124 (2002).
261 See Michael D. Wilcox, Jr. & Philip C. Abbott, Market Power and Structural Adjustment: The
Case of West African Cocoa Market Liberalization (Working Paper Presented at the Am. Agricultural
Econ. Assoc. Annual Meeting, 2004) available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/20084/l/
spO4wiO5.pdf (finding that in African countries in which there are few competition agencies, liberalized
agriculture markets have created opportunities for firms to exert market power via vertical integration
against small farmers).
262 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of
Imported Grain, 170, WT/DS276/R, AB-2004-3 (Aug. 30, 2004).
263 Id.
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could be true. However, predation claims are difficult to prove in an anti-
trust context.264 Moreover, the United States did not make a showing of
such claims in the record at the panel level. And, although the Appellate
Body suggested that it was concerned with such an analysis, neither it nor
the lower level panel did so in its decision. 265
The Appellate Body found that the panel had taken into consideration
that the CWB enjoyed privileges over that of private traders and that even
with these privileges, the CWB could act with commercial considera-
tions.266 This assumes that international private companies may exercise
monopoly power and that STEs are no different. However, private compa-
nies do not operate with the same special privileges, even if they may un-
dertake the same type of behavior. Additionally, anticompetitive conduct by
private traders can be remedied by antitrust regulation. In contrast, the
CWB is immune from Canadian antitrust regulation.
The Appellate Body did not accept that these privileges allowed the
CWB to act outside commercial considerations. Canada argued that the
GATT lacked provisions prohibiting anticompetitive conduct, so that the
privileges could be used so long as an STE behaved as "a rational market
actor. 2 67 If one assumes that a rational market actor would use anticompeti-
tive behavior to raise nvals' costs or undertake a predation strategy because
of its privileges, then any STE could behave as a rational market actor.
Such reasoning provides carte blanche justification for nearly any type of
anticompetitive behavior. In the case of the CWB, neither the evidence in
the case nor the underlying secondary evidence suggested that the CWB has
monopoly power. Without such power, the distortions in question, based on
the private actor versus STE distinction, are irrelevant because the CWB
lacks the monopoly power with which to abuse its position. Moreover, even
if the CWB had such power, any potential entrant may only be one growing
season away from entering the market for international grain to eliminate
this monopoly power. Thus, the WTO Appellate Body probably reached the
correct result. However, the reasoning by which the panel and Appellate
Body reached this result is highly problematic. But, given a better set of
facts, the lack of a distinction that the WTO draws between commercial and
non-commercial actors could lead to perverse results that would allow STEs
264 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986);
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 210 (1993); United States v.
AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th Cir. 2003).
265 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of
Imported Grain, 144, WT/DS276/R, AB-2004-3 (Aug. 30, 2004) ("[O]nly such an analysis will reveal
the type and range of considerations properly considered 'commercial' as regards purchases and sales




HeinOnline  -- 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 173 2009-2010
GEO. MASON L. REV.
to exploit a monopoly position due to antitrust public restraints without
effective WTO redress.
B. A Proposal for Reform
The current state of underdeveloped mechanisms to remedy antitrust
public restraints through domestic or soft law institutions may require an
institutional choice of centralization and hard law. A hard law solution
could raise the bar globally and prevent certain forms of anticompetitive
public restraints.26 The WTO is the preferred institution, but its current
powers are not well-adapted to address public restraints. Consequently, an
effective WTO solution entails a broadening of the WTO's powers to more
adequately address antitrust-related public restraints, while remedying the
existing WTO adjudicatory malfunctions on competition issues.
Public restraints may be the rare situation in which a gap in enforce-
ment may justify a hard law solution and increased centralization vis-a-vis
other institutional alternatives. This would require an understanding of
when it is appropriate and relevant for international institutions to second-
guess domestic ones. Coverage of public restraints at the WTO level allows
for a new way to reach at anticompetitive conduct. That is, what may be
immune to remedy through domestic antitrust coverage may be addressed
internationally. Because immunities as a form of public restraints are not an
issue of overlapping enforcement between domestic and international anti-
trust institutions, the international setting may be the most effective way to
combat immunities.
A WTO solution can only be effective if there is a transformation of
the WTO dispute settlement process toward a more economics-based ap-
proach incorporating antitrust thinking. This requires the creation of an
antitrust tribunal as a first level of WTO adjudication. Appeals should be
handled per the traditional route to the WTO Appellate Body. Recall Dia-
gram B, which illustrated the overlap of antitrust and international trade. An
effective WTO solution would require a two-level screen of both trade and
antitrust inquiries. Successful cases would need to pass both the antitrust
screen and the trade screen. That is, for a WTO remedy to apply, the con-
duct in question would be required to violate both trade-based non-
discrimination and antitrust-based anticompetitive harm. Moreover, a WTO
solution ought to address issues of potential overlapping jurisdiction be-
tween domestic and international adjudication.
268 See THE WTO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY pt. I
(Keith E. Maskus ed., 2004) (discussing the example of IP in the WTO context that set a high floor for
IP rights); Andrew T. Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO: The Lesson from Intellectual
Property, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 933, 934 (2003).
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The proposed WTO solution is not an exclusive solution. In conjunc-
tion with soft law institutions, it should build domestic capacity to limit or
remove public restraints. Hard law solutions are infrequent whereas soft
law fosters day-to-day interaction between agencies. Thus, soft law institu-
tions play a critical role in shaping antitrust norms. They can help to iden-
tify public restraints, develop better practices to reduce them, and serve to
educate regulators and the public at large as to the anticompetitive aspects
of public restraints. A soft law solution on its own would be very gradual,
and in the near-to-medium term allow a significant amount of anticompeti-
tive conduct to go unchallenged, because of the reluctance to take on sig-
nificant public restraints due to public choice concerns. The increased use
of the WTO would help solve what soft law harmonization and domestic
approaches cannot do as effectively in the near-to-medium term--overcome
the domestic political process. It is the domestic political process which has
created antitrust immunities and anticompetitive public restraints. Thus,
revitalizing antitrust regulation and taking action against such restraints
may require an international solution.
1. Modification of the WTO Dispute Settlement System
As the Canada Wheat case study illustrates, the danger in misapplica-
tion of law and economics to an antitrust inquiry at the WTO level is sig-
nificant. Therefore, an effective WTO solution requires a reformation of
how the WTO examines cases that have a public restraints antitrust compo-
nent. Once created, legal institutions are difficult to reform.269 WTO adjudi-
cation is fact-intensive and requires the understanding of complex informa-
tion in a number of potential markets.27° The WTO dispute system, as cur-
rently conceived, has serious shortcomings with regard to its ability to han-
dle competition-related cases that are fact-intensive and require significant
economic analysis. The small number of such cases on the WTO's docket
limit opportunities to improve the WTO's adjudicatory ability through ex-
perience. These factors lead to low levels of expertise in this area of law
and therefore create demand for institutional reform.
A permanent competition policy panel should be set up to adjudicate
WTO cases that have a competition claim. Though this would require some
expansive changes to WTO decision-making, in other ways this solution
would better rein in overly expansive and analytically problematic WTO
competition rulings. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU")
269 Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of International Cooperation, 38
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173, 203 (2005).
270 Peter J. Lloyd, Multilateral Rules for International Competition Law?, 21 WORLD ECON. 1029,
1043-44 (1998).
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has made the WTO less diplomatic and more legalistic.2 71 However, the
WTO lacks a standard of review. This presents potential pitfalls for WTO
dispute settlement adjudication, particularly in competition public restraint
settings, where domestic agency decisions that have a rational basis might
be overturned.
WTO dispute settlement adjudication involves not merely different in-
terpretations of legal policy and rules, but a number of institutional alterna-
tives.172 For example, a WTO panel can be deferential to national regulation
and thereby allocate the decision of policy to the national level. Or it could
strictly apply WTO provisions as a floor for appropriate conduct, thereby
showing no deference to national regulation. Alternatively, it could take a
case-by-case approach as to the appropriate level of liberalized trade and
competition policy. All of these approaches present potential pitfalls.
Some scholars argue that panelists should not fill in the gaps in WTO
agreements because it threatens the political order on which the WTO
agreements have been based.273 There is the additional danger that activist
judges may expand the meaning of particular agreements or draw alterna-
tive meanings. WTO case law suggests that gap-filling may already be oc-
curring. Gap-filling in competition public restraints cases may yield wel-
fare-reducing outcomes because it occurs through adjudicators who lack an
economics-based approach.274 This makes decision-making less predictable
and is more likely to lead to errors in reasoning that will lead to badly de-
cided cases.
An institutional choice of WTO-level adjudication must, for competi-
tion issues, address institutional weaknesses of WTO adjudication more
generally. A supranational entity may increase the costs of decision-
making. This would serve to diminish the quality of participation and repre-
sentation by parties.2 75 Global antitrust regulation is another step removed
from citizen preferences. As such, a sovereignty transfer to the international
271 Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute Set-
tlement 2, 17 (Conference on Dispute Prevention and Dispute Settlement, 2002), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Busch and Reinhardt--PetersmannProject.pdf.
272 Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates?
Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 459, 459
(2004) (providing how this formulation plays out in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights Agreement ("TRIPS agreement")).
273 John H. Jackson, The Role and Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, in
BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM 2000 179, 204 (Susan Margaret Collins & Dani Rodrik eds., 2000) ("The
dispute settlement system cannot and should not bear the weight of formulating new rules either by
filling gaps in the existing agreements or by setting forth norms that carry the organization into totally
new territory such as competition policy or labor standards."). See also John 0. McGinnis, The Political
Economy of Global Multilateralism, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 381, 381 (2000) (developing a model for analyz-
ing and assessing the practices of global multilateralism).
274 Henry N. Butler, The Manne Programs in Economics for Federal Judges, 50 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 351, 352 (1999) (discussing the importance of training the judiciary in economics).
275 Maduro, supra note 211, at 15.
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level creates democratic legitimacy concerns.276 Compounding this in-
creased cost, WTO panelists might be slower to keep up with the latest de-
velopments in antitrust law and economics thinking (if they think about
these issues at all).
2. To a New Solution: A WTO Competition Panel
The fundamental problem that the WTO faces in antitrust public re-
straints cases is that its generalist adjudicators are ill-equipped (lacking
knowledge, experience, and institutional capital) for dealing with complex
international antitrust issues. To date, WTO adjudication has led to mis-
guided and inconsistent rulings.277 This Article proposes to create a stand-
alone competition panel to address all disputes that raise public restraint
issues that directly or indirectly implicate competition policy at the WTO.
This panel would also have ancillary and pendent jurisdiction of claims in
which one element of the claim addresses competition issues. A premise of
effective antitrust is that adjudicators have some level of comfort with eco-
nomics. 278 A competition panel would put the term "economic" back into
the practice of international economic law.
Specialized panels are not unheard of in the trade context. In some
trade agreements, panelists may be chosen for their expertise in a particular
area of substantive law. For example, under the NAFTA financial services
provisions, parties choose panelists from a special roster of financial serv-
ices experts rather than a roster of trade law experts.279 The presumption
behind such treatment is that trade experts may not have a sufficient under-
standing of a highly technical area of law and regulation.
Because of the weakness of existing WTO dispute resolution, to be ef-
fective the WTO requires a permanent panel dedicated to competition pol-
icy. To build the case for a permanent competition panel, one must first
make the case for permanent panels at the WTO more generally. 28° There
are four basic reasons for WTO permanent panels: to reduce the role of the
276 Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or
Global Subsidiarity?, 16 GOVERNANCE 73, 74 (2003).
277 Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101
YALE L.J. 31, 78 (1991) (noting the limitations of generalist courts in regulatory areas).
278 Carlton & Picker, supra note 121, at 10 ("[W]hile both antitrust and regulation are a mix of
economics and politics, antitrust is now organized around an economic core.").
279 David A. Gantz, Government-to-Government Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA's Chapter 20:
A Commentary on the Process, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 481,485 (2000) (citing NAFTA, Art. 1414(3)).
280 See, e.g., Communication from the European Communities, Contribution of the European
Communities and its Member States to the Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
TN/DS/WI (Mar. 13, 2002) (suggesting that a permanent panel be created to adjudicate all WTO dis-
putes); William J. Davey, The Case for a WTO Permanent Panel Body, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 177, 177-78
(2003).
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WTO Secretariat in panel decision-making, to overcome conflicts of current
panelists, to prevent exclusion of EU and U.S. panelists, and to increase the
quality of decision-making.
Currently, most panelists are full-time trade negotiators. This means
that they do not have as much time to spend on their WTO cases as they
would if it were their only job. This has become an increasingly significant
problem as cases have become either more fact-intensive or have involved
questions of first impression (or both). The EC-Biotech Products"5 ' panel
report, for example, reached 1,050 pages. Complex and document-intensive
cases often lead to panelists requesting help from the WTO secretariat staff
in summarizing documents."8 ' In pushing the work to the secretariat staff,
panelists have ceded some of their authority to a WTO secretariat which
may have its own agenda. 83
The current system allows panelists who may have potential conflicts
to adjudicate in such cases. There is not a good system for WTO panelists
to disclose any conflicts (actual or potential) when they are chosen for a
particular case.284 Panelists may have to work with disputants the next day
on a different matter. Additionally, panelists may, in their full time jobs as
trade officials, have conflicts because their home countries may be subject
to the same types of claims going forward.285
Presently, parties can reject panelists who are citizens of countries in a
dispute. This means that often panels exclude potential panelists from the
United States, the EU, and Japan. As of 2009, U.S. nationals have been
panelists only twelve times out of 444 panelist positions.286 In contrast,
nearly a third of the 444 panelists used have been nationals of just four
countries that are often not parties to disputes: Australia, Canada, New Zea-
land, and Switzerland.287 Problems over selection of panelists have in-
creased in frequency. 288 This problem also reduces the expediency of WTO
adjudication. Because of disagreement over panelists, the WTO staff picks
the panelists in over 80 percent of all disputes.289 Permanent panelists would
prevent some of the most qualified panelists from exclusion from panels.
281 Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, WT/DS291, 292, 293/R (Oct. 10, 2006).
282 Scott Miller, Global Dogfight: Airplane Battle Spotlights Power of a Quirky Court-Free-
Lance Judges at WTO to get Boeing-Airbus Case, WALL ST. J., Jun. 1, 2005, at A 1.
283 Alan Win. Wolff, Problems with WTO Dispute Settlement, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 417, 420 (2001).
284 See WTO, Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes ("DSU Rules of Conduct"), art. VI:4 & Annex 3, WT/DSB/RC/l (Dec. 11,
1996), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/rulesconduct.pdf.
285 Wolff, supra note 283, at 422.
286 WorldTradeLaw.net Dispute Settlement Commentary, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/
database/panelistcountrycount.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2009) (subscription required).
287 Id.
288 Davey, supra note 280, at 178.
289 Miller, supra note 282, at Al.
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The advantages of a permanent panel would include time saving in organiz-
ing a panel.
Under the current DSU, a lack of knowledge of competition policy is-
sues may be overcome as panelists can call on special experts in a field to
address particular areas of law. The Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures allows for the use of experts to assist panels.29 ° Some of the WTO
agreements allow for an expert technical group to be assembled, though this
has been followed infrequently.29'
The lack of the use of experts extends to competition cases. In Kodak-
Fuji292 (market access vertical restraints at wholesaler, manufacturer and
retail level against foreign photographic film producer), 1916 Act293 (anti-
dumping law against importers of products sold below market value),
Telmex294 (competition barriers to the provision of telecommunications
services), and Canada Wheat, the panels did not call upon antitrust experts.
Given that these cases are the most competition-like, as some directly im-
plicate competition laws, the inability of panels to appoint competition ex-
perts illustrates that in practice such a solution is unviable. Based on the
existing cases adjudicated before the WTO, for an institution whose pur-
pose is to reduce barriers to competition, WTO panelists have demonstrated
poor reasoning in their competition analysis. Should current WTO panels
adjudicate on competition policy issues, outcomes could threaten competi-
tion law at a global level through decisions that lack an economic under-
standing of competition policy. Because of the lack of use of experts, and
perhaps the lack of incentives to use experts, a new solution must be fash-
ioned to address how to better define and understand competition issues in
WTO decisions.
The idea of a permanent competition panel builds upon earlier scholar-
ship that advocates increased WTO specialization. Andrew Guzman rec-
ommends a departmentalized WTO. According to Guzman, such a frame-
work would allow the WTO to better address "trade plus" issues.295 Guzman
suggests that these departments be modeled after existing WTO Councils,
290 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes, art. 13.2, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226,
1234 (1994).
291 The expert advice that the WTO panel used in the beef hormone case was done on an ad hoc
basis rather than through an expert technical group. David A. Wirth, International Trade Agreements:
Vehicles for Regulatory Reform?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 331, 342 n.30.
292 Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 5.1-
5.22, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998).
293 Appellate Body Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/AB/R &
WT/DS I62/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000).
294 Panel Report, Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, 3.1, WT/DS204/R
(Apr. 2, 2004).
295 Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 303, 307-08
(2004).
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such as the Council for Trade or the Working Group on Investment.296 The
present Article extends Guzman's suggestion to advocate for a specialized
panel to address competition issues as part of WTO dispute settlement. 97
The effectiveness of specialized courts over generalized courts in the
United States in complex regulatory areas also suggests that such an ap-
proach may be valid.29 Dispute settlement may be the only way to address
issues in which there is a regulatory gap because countries do not have the
capacity to effectively challenge public restraints domestically. A competi-
tion policy panel for WTO dispute settlement also may limit WTO forum-
shopping because it would not be possible to recast competition claims as
other types of WTO claims.
A competition law standard or approach can only succeed if there is a
shared standard among adjudicators. 99 On substantive issues, previous dis-
cussions at the WTO could not come to a substantive agreement on how to
address market access issues in which antitrust law interfaced with interna-
tional trade.3"0 Indeed, the demise of the WTO Trade and Competition
Working Group and the OECD Joint Group on Trade and Competition sug-
gests that consensus has yet not been reached on many competition issues
as they relate to international trade.
In its design, a competition policy panel mitigates problems of sub-
stantive disagreement in antitrust law across jurisdictions. A WTO competi-
tion court would adjudicate in two types of situations. In the first situation,
competition jurisprudence would review cases in which a national govern-
ment has adjudicated potential anticompetitive conduct, but where the re-
sulting decision is beyond any justifiable antitrust norm. The second type of
case that would fall under the competition court would be when there is
immunity from antitrust law at the domestic level. The competition panel
would undertake a competition analysis when this behavior otherwise
would not be addressed by domestic antitrust institutions. In this second
situation, the competition panel would embed a competition-based under-
standing of economics into a discussion of trade-based non-discrimination.
This approach would have competition adjudicators apply economic think-
ing about industrial organization to the problems of the definition of rele-
296 Id. at 307 n.28.
297 Guzman, in theory, does not dismiss this possibility. Id. at 321 ("Given the substantial advan-
tage of the WTO over other dispute resolution bodies and the importance of mandatory dispute resolu-
tion to the credibility of commitments, there is a strong case for making a dispute resolution body with
similar characteristics available to negotiators in a range of regulatory areas." (footnote omitted)).
298 ISAAC UNAH, THE COURTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: JUDICIAL SPECIALIZATION, EXPERTISE,
AND BUREAUCRATIC POLICY-MAKING passim (1998); Robert M. Howard, Comparing the Decision
Making of Specialized Courts and General Courts: An Exploration of Tax Decisions, 26 JUST. SYS. J.
135,221 (2005).
299 Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons
from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 557, 573-74 (1994).
300 PHILIP MARSDEN, A COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE WTO passim (2003).
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vant markets and the determination of the exercise of market power as they
apply to issues of non-discrimination."'
A permanent competition panel would increase expertise on the part of
panels in WTO law. This would help to create more nuanced adjudication
and increased predictability. The panel would lead to greater certainty as to
adjudicatory outcomes. Procedural innovations could also result, as perma-
nent panelists would become repeat players. Ideally, potential competition
panelists would already have an antitrust background. Additional expertise
would be acquired over time through repeat iterations of cases. Studies ex-
amining specialized judges in other areas of law show cause for optimism.
For example, a study by Wagner and Petherbridge regarding the success of
the U.S. Federal Circuit suggests progress toward bringing consistency and
predictability to patent law.3"2
Case understanding is dynamic and can reflect the changing currents
in economic thought. The U.S. legal experience in competition jurispru-
dence is a case study of dynamism that can respond to different situations.
William Baxter suggests that provisions for the Sherman Act were broadly
drafted by legislative design:
In failing to provide more guidance, the framers of our antitrust laws did not abdicate their
responsibility any more than did the Framers of the Constitution. The antitrust laws were
written with awareness of the diversity of business conduct and with the knowledge that the
detailed statutes which would prohibit socially undesirable conduct would lack the flexibility
needed to encourage (and at times even permit) desirable conduct. To provide this flexibility,
Congress adopted what is in essence enabling legislation that has permitted a common-law
refinement of antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the most general statutory di-
rections.3"3
If countries trust their domestic courts to develop an evolutionary un-
derstanding of law through precedent, it is possible that a similar preceden-
tial understanding may be reached by adjudicators at the international level,
especially adjudicators that have specialized knowledge in the field."' This
301 Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets
and Measuring Market Power, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 1, 2-3, 29-32 (Paolo Bucci-
rossi ed., 2008) (providing a formulation of how industrial organization economics may become increas-
ingly judicialized in the United States).
302 See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1156 (2004); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 800
(2004).
303 William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law"
Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1982); see also William E. Kovacic, The Modern
Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 381 (2003).
304 In the United States, the Supreme Court shows more deference to the decision-making of ad-
ministrative agencies in case outcomes. Reginald S. Sheehan, Federal Agencies and the Supreme Court:
An Analysis of Litigation Outcomes 1953-1988, 20 AM. POL. Q. 478, 486-87 (1992); Harold J. Spaeth &
Stuart H. Teger, Activism and Restraint: A Cloak for the Justices' Policy Preference, in SUPREME
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proposal would help to transform the WTO into a legalized system that has
a pro-competition jurisprudence based on sound analysis and economic
thinking, rather than one that promotes competitors at the expense of com-
petition. It would help to bridge the gap between trade remedies and anti-
trust remedies by focusing on direct and indirect immunities from competi-
tion which create anticompetitive harm.
A standard objection to this proposal is that we should not expect the
WTO to be better suited to understand complex economic analysis than we
would national courts. Since national courts do not understand the com-
plexities of public restraints in antitrust, how can we expect the WTO Ap-
pellate Body to do better? The response is institutional expertise: a competi-
tion policy court would be able to create a better factual record in its deci-
sion than would a generalized court. A competition court could go through
the nuances of economic thinking better than a court that does not under-
stand competition issues. This also means that a competition court would be
better able to weed out bad cases from reaching the Appellate Body. Be-
cause of its expertise, the court would establish increased credibility in
reaching better reasoned outcomes.305 Theoretically, the effectiveness of the
competition court might impact the Appellate Body more generally in its
thinking or perhaps make the Appellate Body more deferential to the exper-
tise of the competition court.
A competition panel solves a number of concerns regarding WTO ac-
countability, consistency, and predictability.0 6 First, a competition policy
panel addresses the consistency and predictability problems by institutional-
izing knowledge specific to antitrust questions. Such a panel improves ac-
countability because expert opinion can be overseen by a general appellate
body.30 7 Constraints exist on the Appellate Body not to rule in ways that
create too much change politically (especially as to powerful countries).
Even when the WTO panel and appellate body find that a measure is in
violation of WTO rules, countries retain some sovereign control, as they
can choose whether or not to remove the barriers that they have erected.
Should a country choose to enact changes to a domestic policy, this change
COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 277, 279 (Stephen C. Halpem & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982). But
see Robert M. Howard, The Supreme Court Says Rules are Rules: Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue Service, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 221 (2005) (explaining that the Supreme Court showed no
deference at all to Tax Court rules and by extension, no deference to Tax Court expertise).
305 Potentially, it may be less likely to accord the same level of authority for the Appellate Body
than WTO panels. Lawrence Baum, Specialization and Authority Acceptance: The Supreme Court and
Lower Federal Courts, 47 POL. RES. Q. 693, 700 (1994) (finding that the former Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals cited the Supreme Court less than generalist federal courts of appeal).
306 On these concerns, see Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification-The Agency
Problem, 3 CHLI. J INT'L L. 333, 351 (2002).
307 This type of accountability issue also plays out in the U.S. context, where Article Ill courts hear
appeals from FTC administrative law judge decisions.
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must go through traditional domestic legislative or administrative proc-
esses. This allows for input at the domestic level.
And, a ruling against a country does not necessarily mean compliance.
Rather, a country could choose to keep its protectionist measure and merely
take economic penalties instead.3 °8 Countries thus weigh the costs and bene-
fits of protection and determine at the state level whether or not to continue
such protectionist policies. Most WTO rulings have created compliance,
even by the United States and EU.3 °9
Powerful states exert influence in picking Appellate Body members.
The United States and EU have an effective veto over any potential Appel-
late Body member. 31° This power by carries over into Appellate Body deci-
sions. If too many decisions were to go against the EU or the United States,
Appellate Body members understand that the WTO's two major players
would call for structural changes to weaken the WTO dispute settlement
system.31' This same reasoning would hold true for the competition panel.
The United States and EU would have effective veto power over members
of the panel. As such, panelists would have to meet a baseline on competi-
tion policy analysis acceptable to both the EU and the United States. Simi-
larly, competition panelists would understand that any gap-filling on their
part would elicit a negative political reaction by the United States and/or
EU.
An additional question that a solution must address is how to reduce
judicial reach that goes too far into challenging domestic regulation. Be-
cause of the adjudicatory nature of WTO dispute resolution, judicial deci-
sion-making plays a critical institutional role. Transaction cost economics
posits that contracts are incomplete because contracts do not (and cannot)
contain all possible contingencies.312 Even if contracts could do so, a third
party adjudicator must rule on contracts and will lack the same knowledge
as the parties.313 Much like contracts, WTO agreements are incomplete.
308 JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 49 (2001).
309 Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings:
The Record to Date, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 397, 397 (2007).
310 Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Politi-
cal Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 264 (2004).
311 id.
312 OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 4-5,21-23 (1995).
313 Id. at 2 9-55. See also Barak D. Richman & Jeffrey Macher, Transaction Cost Economics: An
Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences (Duke Law Sch. Faculty Scholarship Series,
2006), available at http://Isr.nellco.org/duke fs/62 (providing a literature review of transaction costs
economics).
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WTO panelists must fill in the gaps."4 As with any adjudicatory body, there
is concern that WTO dispute settlement will overreach in its rulings.
To address this concern, it is possible to create a standard of review for
competition-related cases that can limit the scope of judicial intervention
for cases in which there is a domestic alternative. The only agreement in
WTO jurisprudence that includes a specific standard of review is Article
17.6 of the Anti-dumping Agreement ("AD Agreement"). However, under
the other trade remedy agreements, and the WTO Agreement on the Appli-
cation of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement") as well,
panels and the Appellate Body have developed a standard that, in essence,
requires panels to examine the quality of the reasoning of the domestic
agency.
The language of Article 17.6 is purposely similar to that of the U.S.
Chevron doctrine." 5 This language was inserted at the end of the Uruguay
Round by U.S. negotiators who were concerned that a lack of deference in
the WTO Antidumping Agreement would lead to findings against the U.S.
antidumping regime. The Chevron doctrine establishes deference on the
part of courts to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute that may
have ambiguity. Statutory ambiguity in this context is seen as a delegation
of authority by Congress to an administrative agency to resolve the ambigu-
ity.316 In Chevron, the Supreme Court articulated that courts should show
deference to agency decision-making because of agency expertise.3"7 A
Chevron analysis reduces the opportunity for judicial intervention over
agency decision-making.3 18
314 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World Trading
System: Democratic Governance and Competition Culture in the WTO, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 585, 593
(2004).
315 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984). Chevron-
style deference is less likely to be triggered if someone undertakes a textual approach. In contrast, there
will be more cases in which deference is granted if someone looks to legislative history because the
types of ambiguity that an agency has will be greater. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administra-
tive Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521. Political accountability justifies deference to
agencies and regulation. By being less deferential, courts face the problem of becoming increasingly
political in their decision-making as they role on administrative issues. Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial
Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judici-
ary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2000).
316 Under United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001), Chevron has been limited to situations in
which an agency's promulgation has the force of law-situations in which an agency interpretation has
been promulgated after a public notice and comment period.
317 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 ("If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it ap-
pears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would
have sanctioned." (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961))).
318 Some argue Chevron-style deference may be misplaced in the WTO because the context for
Chevron deference is different. Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Stan-
dard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 211 (1996). Member
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The Appellate Body examined the deference requirements under Arti-
cle 17.6 in United States-Hot-Rolled Steel.319 In its summary of the re-
quirements of Article 17.6(i), the Appellate Body held that the purpose of
panels is the "establishment" and "evaluation" of the "facts" of the investi-
gative body.32 The factual determination is not a de novo review; rather,
panels must consider "whether, inter alia, the 'establishment' of the facts
by the investigating authorities was 'proper.'"321 In Mexico-HFCS,32 2 the
Appellate Body held that two elements must be met with an establishment
of the facts. First, there is the fact finding during the investigation. Second,
there are the assumptions that national authorities made in connection with
their determinations. 23 This system could be applied to an antitrust con-
text.3
24
The availability of a competition remedy through a specialized compe-
tition panel would not overwhelm the WTO dispute resolution system. Very
few of the cases that involve Article 17.6 have been brought, though techni-
cally there are not really any 17.6 cases. Rather, party brings a claim under
a substantive provision of the AD Agreement, and then the 17.6 standard
applies. This paucity of cases involving Article 17.6 in itself itself may be
testament to the restraint that the WTO has shown in its decision-making.2
Countries will only bring Article 17.6 claims that they believe they have a
good chance of winning. Of these claims, many will never get beyond the
consultation stage. Of those that do make it to the panel stage, nearly half of
countries are not accountable to other countries for their interpretation of a regulation. In contrast, an
administrative agency is accountable to its domestic legislature. Id. at 208-10. However, Chevron-style
deference serves as a way to formalize WTO commitments by reducing the scope of how a panel can
decide and to overrule domestic competition decision-making. The formalization of a standard of defer-
ence makes the WTO more rather than less accountable to its members.
319 Appellate Body Report, United Stales-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel
Products from Japan, 50-62, WT/DS I 84/AB/R (July 24, 2001).
320 Id. 55.
321 Appellate Body Report, Mexico-Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup
(HFCS) from the United States-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, 84,
WT/DS132/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001). The United States Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000 limits the introduction of new evidence for the evaluation and establishment of the facts, even
when such evidence was available in the public record. United States--Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000, 222, WT/DS217, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003).
322 Appellate Body Report, Mexico-Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup
(HFCS) from the United States-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, 129,
WT/DS132/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001).
323 Id. 84-85.
324 But see Juscelino F. Colares, Alternative Methods of Appellate Review in Trade Remedy Cases:
Examining Results of U.S. Judicial and NAFTA Binational Review of U.S. Agency Decisions from 1989
to 2005, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 192-93 (2008) (arguing that NAFTA Chapter 19 panels have
applied a different standard of review than U.S. courts).
325 James P. Durling, Deference, But Only When Due: WTO Review of Anti-Dumping Measures, 6
J. INT'L ECON. L. 125, 127 (2003).
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the dumping decisions come out in favor of the country that imposed the
duty.326 Only half of the panel decisions are appealed.32 7 Overall, the WTO
system under Article 17.6 seems to work and shows adjudicatory re-
straint.328 In the competition panel context, a similar result is possible.
Countries would bring a claim based on anticompetitive regulation only if
they thought that they had a good chance of winning the case, and only in
situations in which there is a clear violation.
The competition panel also would address a second set of cases. In
these cases, the panel would decide cases when sector regulation/implied
immunities or direct immunities deny a domestic antitrust solution. It would
apply an antitrust analysis to cases in which there was no domestic antitrust
remedy possible. However, it would only do so in situations in which there
was also a violation of non-discrimination. This would solve the problem of
poorly-reasoned WTO decision-making, such as Canada Wheat, which
rejected an antitrust approach outright and lacked the in-depth analysis of
market definition and an abuse of market power that a stand-alone antitrust
inquiry would have applied.329 The ability to undertake such an analysis
assumes the existence of panelists who have the competency of both com-
petition law and international trade law, and who can fashion effective un-
derstandings that include both types of analyses. These types of cases do
not affect domestic antitrust prosecutorial discretion, because no such do-
mestic discretion exists in cases of immunities. Rather, adjudication at the
WTO level for anticompetitive conduct where there is also discrimination
merely reformats WTO decision-making to better understand that competi-
tion issues are complex and specialized in nature. Thus, the competition
panel would address both the non-discrimination issues and the competition
issues that overlap with non-discrimination issues.
A key concern that this proposed solution must overcome is the poten-
tial that the WTO will impose limitations on domestic antitrust dynamism.
Binding international rules may limit the ability of the U.S. to lead by ex-
ample.33 Because WTO commitments are decided by consensus, the large
number of countries involved in the WTO increases the costs of the bar-
gaining process. Trade-off is a hallmark of the WTO. In the antitrust set-
ting, WTO membership leads to potentially difficult issues. A number of
WTO members lack antitrust laws at all. A WTO solution may lead to a
watering down of antitrust law to the lowest common denominator.33" ' If
326 This supports the Priest-Klein theory on litigation outcomes. George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,4-5 (1984).
327 Durling, supra note 325, at 126.
328 Id. at 147.
329 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of
Imported Grain, 145, WT/DS276/AB/R (Aug. 30, 2004).
330 McGinnis, supra note 191,at 566.
331 Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, A Note of Caution with Re-
spect to a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy, Address to The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
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global competition rules are weak, then special interest groups may extract
rents on a worldwide scale rather than on a national scale.332 Retrenchment
of commitments is also possible, as the example of WTO intellectual prop-
erty commitments under the TRIPS agreement illustrates. The TRIPS expe-
rience shows that even with a high level global floor on intellectual prop-
erty rights, a sufficiently high level of opposition going forward can lead to
a retrenchment of commitments.3 33
Such fears may be overblown. With a deferential standard for dispute
settlement, U.S. (or any other country's) antitrust dynamism should not be
restrained, except in those cases, such as immunities, in which the U.S.
antitrust experience should not be emulated. If a U.S. domestic antitrust
decision is well-reasoned, there would be no viable WTO case because it
would meet the standard of Article 17.6. In cases in which there is no U.S.
domestic response because of an inability to reach such conduct, a WTO
solution would be the only venue to undertake an analysis and determine
appropriate. remedies for the anticompetitive effects of public restraints.
Moreover, the goals of antitrust law may change over time based on the
level of political and economic development and the openness to the global
economy.334 The best way to ensure that international antitrust remedies
remain dynamic is to create WTO competition policy panelists who can
respond to changes in economic thinking and apply such thinking.
The WTO system itself also serves as a check on activist judges. If
WTO adjudicators rule in ways that fundamentally alter the political deals
forged that underlie the WTO agreements, WTO members would respond
by diminishing the power of the WTO dispute settlement process in a future
round of agreements. Particularly if rulings decide too often against the
interests of both the EU and U.S., these powerful entities will push to re-
write the rules. The U.S. and EU can signal displeasure with WTO rulings
through diplomatic statements or through non-compliance. Because of the
(Nov. 18, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/0998.htm. Even if there were
some level of global consensus on substantive issues of antitrust enforcement to promote a common
definition of efficiency, other government ministries or the legislatures of certain countries may react
against such concerns because of other perceived national interests that trump antitrust. See Allan Fels,
Competition Policy: Governance Issues-What Are the Alternative Structures? Australia's Experience 3
(2001), available at http://www.Accc.gov.Au/content/item.phtml?itemld=255475&nodeld=808alc09
39d5520567dd09697e0f6c0d&fn=FelsCanada 20_6_01%5B1%5D.pdf ("A, competition regime needs
to operate in conjunction with other government policies. Inevitably, conflict between policies will arise
and it will therefore be necessary to determine priorities based on an assessment of national interests.").
332 John 0. McGinnis, The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and Customary
International Law: The Example of the WTO, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 229, 237-38 (2003).
333 See, for example, the decisions by the governments of Thailand and Brazil to break patent
protection for essential medicines. Roger Bate, Thailand and the Drug Patent Wars, AEI HEALTH
POL'Y OUTLOOK, Apr. 2007, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070404 HPO.pdf.
334 Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Law on a Global Scale: Races Up, Down, and Sideways, in
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 348, 348-49
(Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001).
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potential costs of judicial overreach, a more formalized adjudicative stan-
dard may be devised. With a limited judicial reach and a system that favors
big country litigants, even should a competition panel rule against the
United States or the EU on claims involving direct or indirect antitrust im-
munities, these WTO members likely will abide by a WTO decision, as
they have more to gain than lose from the WTO system. Such a ruling may
serve as the impetus necessary to create legitimacy for change domestically
and reduce the scope of public restraints.
A WTO competition panel will be influenced by the U.S. and EU. This
will occur directly through likely WTO choices for competition panelists.
Indirectly, the United States, EU and other developed countries will play a
role in who adjudicates on the panel because most potential panelists will
have been trained in the developed world in antitrust law and may accept
developed-world approaches on how antitrust regulation may be linked to
international trade. This could increase the potential pushback from devel-
oping-world countries against the WTO and a competition policy tribunal.
It may create a domestic backlash to weaken domestic agencies that already
have difficulty in establishing their power and legitimacy. However, these
types of concerns are not unique to a competition panel. Rather, these con-
cerns are inherent to the WTO system. Well-reasoned decisions will limit
such concerns even in the case of antitrust immunities which may be the
most "political" and hence the hardest subject upon which to hope for mul-
tilateral consensus.
CONCLUSION
Anticompetitive public restraints play a distortive role in the global
economy. Antitrust immunities are one such case in which public restraints
hurt consumers. Though anticompetitive public restraints plague each coun-
try, domestic institutions seem ill-equipped to adequately limit these re-
straints. International institutions can assist domestic antitrust institutions to
create better outcomes to address anticompetitive public restraints.
Benchmarking through soft law and bottom-up harmonization based
upon domestic approaches on competition advocacy can help domestic in-
stitutions to limit some of the effects of public restraints. However, there
are limitations to the soft law approach in improving domestic antitrust
capacities. Where substantive coordination is difficult, such as with public
restraints, binding rules may be the most effective way to address the global
nature of the problem. This implicates the WTO as the most appropriate
institutional choice to combat public restraints. Because the WTO considers
global welfare, the WTO disciplines countries that fail to reduce interna-
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tional spillover and market access policies.335 However, the WTO contains
significant limitations in its adjudicatory ability to adequately identify and
remedy antitrust public restraints.
All institutions have weaknesses, but in the case of public restraints,
international hard law through the WTO (properly reformed) can help ad-
dress these problems in ways that create few domestic overlaps and new
distortions of their own. Creating an antitrust panel for WTO antitrust pub-
lic restraints that would be deferential to domestic antitrust solutions is a
first step to improving the adjudicatory capacity of the WTO. Hard law will
work with soft law to improve the domestic institutions so that over time,
domestic institutions need much less of the international institutions to do
this work, because many of the cases will be decided in the shadow of the
law. In a world of imperfect alternatives, this proposal has fewer costs and
greater benefits than domestic or international soft law solutions.
335 Damien Neven & Paul Seabright, Trade Liberalization and the Coordination of Competition
Policy, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 381, 399 (Leonard Waverman, William
Comanor & Akira Goto eds., 1997); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED
WORLD ECONOMY 107-08 (1994).
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